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Abstract
Multimedia communications over IP are booming as they offer higher flex-
ibility and more features than traditional voice and video services. IP tele-
phony known as Voice over IP (VoIP) is one of the commercially most
important emerging trends in multimedia communications over IP. Due to
the flexibility and descriptive power, the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)
is becoming the root of many sessions-based applications such as VoIP and
media streaming that are used by a growing number of users and organiza-
tions. The increase of the availability and use of such applications calls for
careful attention to the possibility of transferring malformed, incorrect, or
malicious SIP messages as they can cause problems ranging from relatively
innocuous disturbances to full blown attacks and frauds.
Given this scenario, a deep knowledge of the normal behavior of the net-
work and users is essential to problem diagnosis and security protection of
IP Telephony. Moreover, analysis tools taking into account service seman-
tics and troubleshooting VoIP systems based on SIP are of paramount im-
portance for network administrators. However, efficient design and deploy-
ment of robust and high performance security controlling systems remain
a high challenge, in particular due to the open architecture of the Internet,
heterogeneous environment and real time communication constraint.
This thesis deals with the analysis and protection of services based on
the SIP protocol with a special focus on SIP based VoIP applications. The
first part of the work is dedicated to the conformance and security analysis
v
of SIP based VoIP services. To this end, our first endeavor is to define a
formal conceptual model of VoIP threat domain with the aim to exchange a
common vocabulary about the security related information of the domain.
We have introduced an ontology defined as “VoIP-Onto” that provides a
formal representation of a comprehensive taxonomy of VoIP attacks fol-
lowed by specific security recommendations and guidelines for protecting
the underlying infrastructure from these attacks. The use of “VoIP-Onto”
is not only limited to as a general vocabulary and extensible dictionary for
sharing domain knowledge about VoIP security, but also can be employed
in a real environment for testing or intrusion detection purposes.
We have also concentrated on designing synthetic traffic generators con-
sidering the difficulties and challenges of collecting real-world VoIP traffic
for the purpose of testing monitoring and security controlling tools. To
this end, we have introduced “VoIPTG”, a generic synthetic traffic genera-
tor, that provides flexibility and efficiency in generation of large amount of
synthetic VoIP traffic by imitating the realistic behavior profiles for users
and attackers. We have also implemented “SIP-Msg-Gen”, a SIP fuzzer,
capable to generate both the well-formed and fuzzed SIP messages with ease.
Then, we focus on designing an on-line filter able to examine the stream
of incoming SIP messages and classifies them as “good” or “bad” depend-
ing on whether their structure and content are deemed acceptable or not.
Because of the different structure, contents and timing of the SIP “bad”
messages, their filtering is best carried out by a multistage classifier con-
sisting of deterministic lexical analyzer and supervised machine learning
classifiers. The performance and efficiency of our proposed multi-stage fil-
tering system is tested with a large set of SIP based VoIP traffic including
both the real and synthetic traces. The experimental result of the filtering
system is very promising with high accuracy providing fast attack detection.
Next, the focus is shifted on the understanding and modeling the social
vi
interaction patterns of users of the VoIP domain. The notion of “social
networks” is applied in the context of SIP based VoIP network, where “so-
cial networks” of VoIP users are built based on their telephone records.
Then, Social Network Analysis (SNA) techniques are applied on these “so-
cial networks” of VoIP users to explore their social behavioral patterns.
A prototype of filtering system for SIP based VoIP services is also imple-
mented to demonstrate that the knowledge about the social behavior of the
VoIP users is helpful in problem diagnosis, intruders detection, and secu-
rity protection. The filtering system is trained with the normal behavioral
patterns of the users. The machine, thus trained, is capable of identifying
“malicious” users.
Keywords: VoIP, Session Initiation Protocol (SIP), Traffic analysis,
Anomaly Detection, Social Behavior Analysis, Supervised Learning,
SVM, Clustering
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Multimedia Communications Over IP
Multimedia communications over Internet Protocol network have become
increasingly important due to the simplicity and flexibility of packet switch-
ing using the IP protocol. IP telephony, also known as Voice over IP
(VoIP), is one of the commercially most important trends in multime-
dia communications over IP. It enables people to use the Internet as the
transmission medium for voice communications by sending voice as data
packets over private or public IP networks as well as reassembling and de-
coding at the receiving end. VoIP services are generally based on standard
protocols for signaling (i.e., Session Initiation Protocol (SIP), H.323, and
Media Gateway Control Protocol (MGCP)) and transporting media, al-
beit solutions like Skinny1 by Cisco and the Open Source IAX2 adopted by
Asterisk project are very popular in enterprise solutions. A diagram of a
typical VoIP network is presented in Fig. 1.1.
SIP seems to be the most promising candidate as the signaling proto-
col for future IP-based telephony services. It has also been chosen by the
1Skinny Call Control Protocol,
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/tech/voice/skinny-call-control-protocol-sccp/index.html
2IAX: Inter-Asterisk eXchange, http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5456
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Figure 1.1: A typical campus VoIP network
Third-Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) as the protocol for multi-
media application in 3G mobile networks [61]. Due to its flexibility and
descriptive power, SIP is becoming the support not only for Voice over
IP and Internet telephony, but also for many other so called session-based
applications, such as most multimedia streaming, chats, and many others
integrating web-services with telephone and voice. Particularly, SIP based
VoIP opens up exciting possibilities for both businesses and individuals
by lowering the cost and increasing the flexibility in communication and
operation.
1.2 Session Initiation Protocol
SIP (RFC 3261 [156] and related documents) is an application-layer signal-
ing protocol for creating, modifying, and terminating multimedia sessions
2
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between two or more participants (could be a simple two-way telephone call
or a collaborative multimedia conference session) in an IP based network.
It is a request-response based protocol.
1.2.1 SIP Components
The SIP protocol follows the client/server model whose basic components
are:
• User Agents (UA): A SIP user agent is a logical network end-point
used to create or receive SIP messages and thereby manage a SIP
session. User agent itself has a client element, the User Agent Client
(UAC) and a server element, the User Agent Server (UAS). The UAC
is responsible to create requests, and the UAS processes and responds
to each request generated by a UAC. SIP UA can be lightweight clients
suitable for embedding in end-user devices such as mobile handsets
or PDAs, alternatively, they can be desktop applications (e.g., soft-
phones).
• SIP Servers: The main function of the SIP servers is to help user
agents to establish sessions or to perform other functions by providing
name resolution and user location, and to pass on messages to other
servers using next hop routing protocols.
– Proxy Server
The proxy server is an intermediary entity that acts as both a
server and a client for the purpose of making requests on behalf
of other clients. A proxy server primarily plays the role of rout-
ing, meaning that its job is to ensure that a request is sent to
another entity closer to the targeted user agent. When a user
agent client wants to establish a call, it does not know where
3
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callee’s user agent server is located. It only knows where is the
out-bound proxy of the callee, so it relays the request to it. The
outbound proxy can directly deliver the request if it knows recip-
ient’s address otherwise, through Domain Name System (DNS)
lookup over the SIP URIs, it will discover the incoming proxy for
the callee and forwards the request.
– Location Service
A location service is used by a SIP redirect or proxy server to ob-
tain information about a callee’s possible location. For this pur-
pose, the location service maintains a database of SIP-address/IP-
address mappings.
– Redirect Server
The redirect server is used during session initiation to determine
the address of the called device and it informs the caller’s UA
about the next hop server. The caller’s UA then contacts the
next hop server directly.
– Registrar Servers
User Agents contact registrar servers to announce their presence
in the network. The SIP registrar server is a database containing
locations and users preferences as indicated by the User Agents.
A registrar server accepts SIP registration requests and binds the
information it receives (the SIP address and associated IP address
of the registering device).
1.2.2 SIP Addresses
Users in a SIP environment are identified by SIP Uniform Resource Iden-
tifiers (URIs). The format of a SIP URI is similar to an e-mail address,
generally consisting of a username and a domain name. In turn, a SIP URI
4
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is mapped with a terminal address. The username part can be a string or
a number, for instance:
sip:bob@chicago.com
sip:1234567890@chicago.com
1.2.3 SIP Message Format
SIP is a text-based protocol, the information exchanged within the protocol
is encoded as strings of characters. SIP messages are divided into lines of
characters where a line is a series of characters that is delimited with the
two characters Carriage Return and Line Feed (CRLF).
There are two types of SIP messages: requests and responses. Both of
them consist of a start line, one or more header fields, an empty line indi-
cating the end of the header fields, and an optional message body. Header
fields are composed of a field name, followed by a colon (“:”), followed by
the field value, and terminated by CRLF. The body of a message is simply
lines of characters.
A SIP message contains two types of headers: (i)mandatory, (ii)optional.
A specific header field can be mandatory for a particular type of message
while it is optional for others. For example, the Contact header field is
mandatory in an INVITE request message while it is optional for other
types of request messages. Also, some headers can only appear once in
a message (e.g., From, To, Call-ID, etc); multiple occurrences of them in
the same message should be flagged as an error and the corresponding
message should be discarded. Unfortunately, some of these rules are not
fully obeyed in all implementations of the SIP protocol, and therefore it
is possible for “erroneous” messages to be transferred from node to node
over the network.
Syntax of the SIP messages are defined by a context-free grammar speci-
5
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Table 1.1: SIP Request Methods
Request Method Description
INVITE To initiate a call to the other party
ACK To respond to a corresponding INVITE request
BYE To terminate a call
OPTIONS To obtain information about the capabilities of servers
REGISTER To register a user account
CANCEL To abort any pending request
PRACK To sent provisional acknowledgment
SUBSCRIBE To subscribe for notification from the notifier
NOTIFY To notify the subscriber of a new event
PUBLISH To publish an event to the Server
INFO To send mid-session information
REFER To ask the recipient to issue call transfer
MESSAGE To transport instant messages
UPDATE To modify the state of a session
fied in Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) [35], a metalanguage based
on Backus-Naur Form (BNF). As an example, the general structure of a
SIP message is defined as:
generic-message = start-line *message-header | CRLF [message-body]
start-line = request-line | status-line
This indicates that a SIP generic-message consists of a start-line, fol-
lowed by zero or more repetitions of a message-header, followed by an
empty line (CRLF) and finally by an optional [message-body] (shown en-
closed in square brackets to indicate it is optional). The start-line, in
turn, consists of either a request-line or a status-line.
The SIP protocol allows 14 different request methods (listed in Table
1.1) that can be invoked in a request-line. Fig. 1.2 shows an example
of “good” INVITE request messages which is syntactically correct and
semantically meaningful. The reply code is an integer number (in the form
of three digit numbers) from 100 to 699 and indicates type of the response.
There are 6 classes of responses:
6
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INVITE sip:user2@server2.com SIP/2.0 
Via:SIP/2.0/UDP pc33.server1.com;branch=z9hG4bK776 
Max-Forwards : 70 
To :  user2 sip:user2@server2.com 
From :  user1 <sip: user1@server1.com>;tag=19283017     
Call-ID : a84b4c76e66710@pc33.server1.com 
CSeq :  3121 INVITE 
Contact :  sip:user1@pc33.server1.com 
 
o= user1 2890844526 IN IP4 pc33.server1.com 
s = Session SDP 
c = IN IP4 157.24.25.137 
t = 0 0 :  sip:user1@pc33.server1.com 
m = audio 49172 RTP/AVP 0 
a = rtpmap:0 PCMU/8000 
Start Line 
H
ead
ers 
M
essage B
o
d
y 
Figure 1.2: Example of a well formed SIP INVITE message
• Provisional Responses (1xx): Range of response codes of this cat-
egory is 100-199. A provisional response informs its recipient that the
associated request was received but the result of the processing is not
known yet. Provisional responses are sent only when the processing
does not finish immediately. The sender must stop retransmitting the
request upon reception of a provisional response. For instance, typ-
ically proxy servers send responses to the user agent with code 100
(Trying) when they start processing an SIP INVITE.
• Successful Responses (2xx): A final response is the ultimate re-
sponse that the originator of the request will ever receive. Therefore
final responses express the result of the processing of the associated
request. Responses with code from 200 to 299 belong to this category
and they indicate that the request was processed successfully and ac-
cepted. For instance a 200 OK response is sent when a user accepts
invitation to a session (INVITE request).
• Redirection Responses (3xx): Range of response codes of this
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category is 300-399. 3xx responses are used to redirect a caller. A
redirection response gives information about the user’s new location
or an alternative service that the caller might use to satisfy the call.
These responses are usually sent by proxy servers. When a proxy
receives a request and does not want or can not process it for any
reason, it will send a redirection response to the caller and put another
location into the response which the caller might want to try. It can
be the location of another proxy or the current location of the callee
(from the location database created by a registrar). The caller is then
supposed to re-send the request to the new location.
• Client Failure Responses (4xx): Range of response codes of this
category is 400-499. These are client error responses. 4xx are negative
final responses. A 4xx response means that the problem is on the
sender’s side. The request couldn’t be processed because it contains
bad syntax or cannot be fulfilled at that server. For example, typically
SIP servers send responses with code 400 (bad request) when they
receive SIP INVITE request messages with syntax error from clients.
• Server Failure Responses (5xx): Range of response codes of this
category is 500-599. A 5xx means that the problem is on server’s
side. The request is apparently valid but the server failed to fulfill it.
Clients should usually retry the request later.
• Global Failure Responses (6xx): Range of response codes of this
category is 600-699. A 6xx reply code means that the request cannot
be fulfilled at any server. This response is usually sent by a server
that has definitive information about a particular user. For example,
user agents usually send a 603 Decline response when the user does
not want to participate in the session.
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1.2.4 SIP Signaling
SIP is based on the request-response paradigm. The following sequence is
a simple example of a call set-up procedure:
• To initiate a session, the caller (or User Agent Client) sends a request
with the SIP URI of the called party.
• If the client knows the location of the other party it can send the
request directly to their IP address; if not, the client can send it to
a locally configured SIP network server. The server will attempt to
resolve the called user’s location and send the request to them. There
are many ways to do this, such as searching the DNS or accessing
databases. Alternatively, the server may be a redirect server that
may return the called user location to the calling client for it to try
directly. During the course of locating a user, one SIP network server
can proxy or redirect the call to additional servers until it arrives at
one that definitely knows the IP address where the called user can be
found.
• Once found, the request is sent to the user and then several options
arise. In the simplest case, the user’s telephony client receives the
request, that is, the user’s phone rings. If the user takes the call, the
client responds to the invitation with the designated capabilities of the
client software and a connection is established. If the user declines the
call, the session can be redirected to a voice mail server or to another
user.
1.2.5 A Simple Session Establishment Example
Fig. 1.3 shows an example of a call flow from User Agent A to User Agent
B. A session is initiated when UAC A sends an INVITE message to the
9
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appropriate proxy server indicating that UAC A (caller) wish to commu-
nicate/talk with UAC B (callee). Immediately, the proxy server sends
a response message (TRYING 100) to UAC A to acknowledge that the
INVITE is handled and attempts to resolve the called user’s (UAC B) lo-
cation and sends the request to UAC B. UAC B sends a response (Ringing
180) when his telephone begins to ring. Finally, when UAC B receives the
request and picks the call, i.e. UAC B (callee) responds (OK 200 message)
to the invitation and a connection is established. Then media streams are
exchanged directly between UAC A (caller) and UAC B (callee). The ses-
sion is ended by an BYE request message to the server from any UAC (A
or B) and a reply with an OK 200 message from other UAC.
INVITE
INVITE
100 Trying
180 Ringing
180 Ringing
200 OK
200 OK
ACK
ACK
Media  Session
200 OK
200 OK
BYE
BYE
User Agent
      A SIP Sever 
User Agent
      B
Figure 1.3: Example of a SIP multimedia session
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1.2.6 SIP Registration Example
The first step for a user agent to use a SIP-based service is to identify
his/her actual location in terms of an IP address. Consequently, the user
needs to register the combination of his/her SIP address and current IP
address at the SIP registrar responsible for his domain. An example of
registration procedure is depicted in Fig. 1.4.
REGISTER
A@server1.com, IP
Unauthorized 407
REGISTER +credential
200 OK
User Agent
      A
Registrar
Server
Figure 1.4: Example of SIP Registration procedure
1.2.7 SIP Security
Rosenberg et al. [156] in the SIP protocol specification did not define new
security mechanism specific to SIP, rather they suggested the reuse of ex-
isting security models derived from the HTTP3 and SMTP4 space. Later,
the IETF has made several improvements that provide protection for the
3Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), RFC 2068, http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2616
4Simple Mail Transfer Protocol, RFC 821, http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc821
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SIP based VoIP signaling and media streams. The most relevant recom-
mendations are the use of TLS (Transport Layer Security) [42] to protect
SIP signaling and the SRTP5 to protect the media stream. Authors of [5]
proposed functionality supplements to the existing methods of security
mechanisms between SIP entities. A secure authentication mechanism is
defined in [139] to overcome the inadequacy for cryptographically assuring
the identity of the end users that originate SIP requests. A brief discussion
on the existing security policies in SIP protocol for ensuring confidentiality,
integrity, and authentication is found in [184].
Digest Authentication
SIP provides a stateless and challenge-based mechanism based on authen-
tication in HTTP [60] to provide message authentication and replay pro-
tection. It supports both user-to-user and proxy-to-user authentication.
Upon receiving a request message, a proxy server or UA can challenge the
initiator of the request to provide assurance of its identity. Only an au-
thorized user is identified and his/her request is processed by the server or
UA. While a server can legitimately challenge most SIP requests, ACK and
CANCEL request messages require special handling for authentication.
Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol
TLS [42] provides transport-layer security over connection-oriented proto-
cols. The protocol is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, or
message forgery in client/server applications and can be used to protect
communication in SIP based services. TLS is suitable for providing hop-
by-hop security between hosts with no pre-existing trust association. For
example, UA A trusts his local proxy server, which after a certificate ex-
change decides to trust UA B’s local proxy server, which B trusts, hence
5Secure Real-time Transport Protocol, RFC 3711, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3711.txt
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B and A can communicate securely.
IPSec
IPSec is a set of network-layer protocol tools [100] that collectively can
be used for securing IP communications by authenticating and encrypting
each IP packet of a communication session. IPSec can be used either in
end-to-end or hop-by-hop basic. IPsec can offer confidentiality, integrity,
data-origin authentication services by utilizing the Encapsulating Security
Payload (ESP)6 and Authentication Header (AH)7 protocols. Introducing
IPsec in SIP can secure the communication, provided that some sort of
trust (e.g., pre-shared keys, certificates) relationship has already existed
between the communicating parties. IPSec can provide network layer en-
cryption to secure a VoIP packet stream, but due to the key management
issues and problems of integrating with higher level protocols it is not
widely used in commercially available UAs.
Secure Multi-purpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME)
Encrypting entire SIP messages end-to-end for the purpose of confidential-
ity is not appropriate because network intermediaries (like proxy servers)
need to view certain header fields in order to route messages correctly. Use
of S/MIME [145] can avoid this problem. S/MIME is a standard for public
key encryption and signing of MIME data. SIP messages have MIME bod-
ies, therefore S/MIME allows SIP UAs to secure MIME data within SIP.
Thus it can provide end-to-end confidentiality and integrity for message
bodies without affecting message headers.
6IP Encapsulating Security Payload, RFC 4303, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4303
7IP Authentication Header, RFC 4302, http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4302.html
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Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (or SRTP)
SRTP defines a profile of the Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) [161]
in order to provide encryption, message authentication and integrity, and
replay protection to the RTP data and to the control traffic for RTP.
1.3 Security Threats
The last decade has seen a sharp increase in the use of the Internet for
voice communications due to the significant cost advantage (e.g., low cost
telephony), higher flexibility and richer telephony features (e.g., instant
messaging, Internet conferencing rooms, personalized call transfer, etc)
than traditional public switched telephone networks (PSTN). Recently, the
transition of telephony over IP platforms has entered its final phase: VoIP
directly to the home/business users. All major operators in the EU and
US are now running SIP-based [101] telephony networks in order to reduce
operating costs and to provide modern and richer telephony services.
Though the wide deployment of VoIP has offered numerous advantages
for end users and providers, simultaneously has introduced an increasing
number of security threats, vulnerabilities and attacks not previously en-
countered in networks with a closed architecture like the Public Switch
Telephone Network (PSTN). The security problem domain of VoIP is con-
siderably larger compared to the traditional PSTN due to several factors:
• Open Architecture of the Internet: VoIP/IP Telephony utilizes
the Internet architecture, similar to any other data application. How-
ever, in an open environment such as the Internet, launching an attack
on a telephony server is much simpler as hackers have easy access and
much experience. Therefore, VoIP applications inherit a wide set of
security weaknesses and threats that are associated with the IP pro-
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tocol.
• Convergence of data and voice networks : In PSTN, security,
reliability, and availability are achieved by using a closed networking
environment dedicated to a single service. In such services, voice con-
versations were conducted along dedicated circuits that were either
fixed for private networks, or set up temporarily and torn down after-
wards in dial-up networks. Either way each call session was shielded
both from other voice calls and from other forms of electronic traffic
such as data. Moreover, PSTN maintains a separate network for sig-
naling. This made it easier both to protect voice networks from the
kind of attacks that data networks were subject to, and also to ensure
that the service was highly reliable.
On the other hand, VoIP is meant to work on an open environment
such as the Internet, that means, similar to any other data applica-
tion it uses the same network for both signaling and data transport.
Therefore, due to the lack of a separated and secure signaling and con-
trol plane VoIP applications not only inherit the security weaknesses
and threats that are associated with the IP protocol but also bring
additional security risks.
• Real Time Communication: VoIP is a real-time application, it
requires timely packet delivery with low latency, jitter, packet loss,
and sufficient bandwidth. VoIP is more vulnerable to attack [88, 89,
163] then even from other web/Internet services due to its real time
communication constraint.
• Complex Architecture: Though the biggest selling points of VoIP
are feature-richness, openness and modularity, these are the root of
the complexity in architecture of VoIP systems. VoIP technology al-
lows a number of independent implementations and products with
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distinct configurable parameters and design choices in order to be
able to operate in a variety of environments, business settings, and
network conditions, resulting high complexity in term of architecture
and operation.
• Use of Open Standards Protocols for Signaling and Media :
As SIP is a text based protocol, it is relatively easy to manipulate
and transfer malformed, incorrect, or malicious SIP messages. These
messages can cause problems ranging from relatively innocuous dis-
turbances to full blown attacks and frauds. SIP-based applications,
appear to be much more sensitive than web services or e-mails to
intrusion and mis-functioning.
Though security and privacy should be mandatory for an IP tele-
phony architecture, most of the attention during the initial design of
the SIP-based multimedia architecture has been focused on the pos-
sibility of providing new dynamic and powerful services instead of
efficient security features and policies. Even, Rosenberg et al. [156]
did not define new security mechanisms in the SIP protocol specifi-
cation. Instead, they recommended the adoption of existing security
models used over the Internet. It has been found that even with cer-
tain existing security mechanisms, SIP protocol is still facing severe
security challenges, leaving VoIP applications to security risks. All
the elements of the SIP architecture (i.e., proxy-registrar servers and
end-user devices) are vulnerable to these kinds of attacks.
As the popularity and use of VoIP application increases, it becomes
an highly attractive target for various attacks [102, 199]. A survey of the
known/disclosed vulnerabilities of VoIP listed in the Common Vulnerabil-
ities and Exposures (CVE)8 database is found in [102]. An experiment
8Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures, http://cve.mitre.org/
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with leading deployed VoIP services shows that these services are vulner-
able to a number of VoIP exploits that essentially violate the VoIP users’
basic trust [199]. Though the motivations are the same for VoIP attackers
as they have been for traditional telephone attackers and hackers (e.g., to
benefit financially via unauthorized access, to steal identity and informa-
tion, to gain notoriety by disrupting service, and to disturb users through
unwanted calls and to embarrass service providers), success rate of attack
generation is noticeably high in the context of VoIP applications. An ex-
periments of SIP end-devices is conducted in [88] to check the robustness
of the services. The authors have shown that even the best performing SIP
end-devices could not withstand medium level call request flooding attacks.
In traditional telecommunication networks, fraud accounts for annual losses
at an average of 3%-5% of the operators’ revenue and still increasing at a
rate of more than 10% yearly [148], while, in VoIP networks, the situation
is worse as the possibility and opportunity of occurring fraudulent activity
in VoIP is high [13, 141, 185]. Even by hacking a single packet of informa-
tion from a stream being transmitted over an IP network, malicious users
can potentially access confidential information or use stolen credentials to
access a phone number for fraudulent activity. As a consequence, fraud
detection in VoIP is harder than the one in the current telecommunication
networks.
With the significant reduction of communication cost VoIP technology
has become an attractive target for the hackers. For instance, the trans-
mission of unsolicited calls already exists in the traditional PSTN, where
such calls are mostly initiated by telemarketers and malicious users for
telemarketing and even fraud intention. However, the high cost of PSTN
calls compared to email or VoIP communications limits the attractiveness
of this form of advertisement for telemarketers. It was found that SIP spam
call also known as SPIT (SPam over Internet Telephony) is roughly four
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orders of magnitude cheaper to send than traditional circuit-based tele-
marketer calls [155]. Due to this, SPIT which refers to the transmission of
unsolicited bulk messages over VoIP has become a urgent problem, similar
to that of email spam. Many attacks that are launched against VoIP users
and networks are not successfully launched against the traditional circuit-
switched telephone network. Particularly, in PSTN it is considered very
difficult to launch any kind of attack without having any physical access
to the network. This is not the case for VoIP based Internet services, since
a vulnerability in the service/protocol can be exploited easily by utilizing
various VoIP security testing and attack generation tools. For example,
eavesdropping in the context of VoIP is easier than PSTN. Eavesdropping
in VoIP is somewhat different from the traditional eavesdropping in data
networks, but the general concept remains the same. It requires intercept-
ing the signaling and associated media streams of a conversation. In case
of traditional telephony an attacker cannot easily access and install a tap
on a telephone pair outside victim’s house as it implies more exposure.
On the other hand, IP eavesdropping can be done from the comfort of
attacker’s laptop as long as he/she posses the tools and expertise to carry
out the attack successfully (e.g., to sniff the media transmission and trans-
form it in an audio file). Again, the man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack is
also considered one of the most serious threats to the security and trust
of existing VoIP protocols and systems [31, 210]. For example, the MITM
who is in the VoIP signaling and/or media path can easily wiretap, divert
and even hijack selected VoIP calls by tampering with the VoIP signaling
and/or media traffic.
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1.4 Motivation of the Thesis
With the increasing popularity of VoIP services, the availability, confi-
dentiality, and integrity of VoIP communication has become increasingly
compromised by remote intrusions. Though SIP-based VoIP has become
a popular alternative to traditional PSTN due to its flexibility and feature
richness, it is more vulnerable to attack than the traditional architecture
and even from other web/internet services. Ensuring security with strong
access control and encryption policies is hardly scalable in the highly open
and dynamic architecture of the Internet. To this end, the IETF has made
several improvements that provide protection for the VoIP signaling and
media streams. Due to the overheads of implementation and performance
these security mechanisms have not been fully implemented and deployed
in current VoIP applications. Moreover, existing security solutions are not
efficient to cope with the increasing sophisticated large-scale attacks and
malwares situations in SIP based services. In such a scenario, analysis tools
taking into account service semantics and troubleshooting VoIP systems
based on SIP are of paramount importance for network administrators.
SIP seems to be quickly gaining in acceptance as the underlying proto-
col for many VoIP applications. Since SIP is so widespread and ubiquitous,
great care should be taken to ensure its resilience and security in presence
of incorrect, malformed or malicious messages that could disrupt or per-
haps even block entirely the flow of messages across a telecommunication
network. Session-based applications, and conversational ones in particular,
appear to be much more sensitive than web services or e-mails to intrusion,
mis-functioning and even incorrect interpretation of the standard, if not for
else, because their real-time nature prevents off-line inspection or semantic
analysis of the content.
Though the extensibility and features’ richness of SIP protocol deter-
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mined its success, but also decreed the drawback of making SIP the most
complex IETF standard ever. This, together with the additional extensions
added by other standards organizations and consortiums, have turned SIP
in a protocol hard to debug and troubleshoot. As if this was not enough,
telecommunications operators are using today SIP to implement many dif-
ferent services resulting in a complex interdependency across numerous
network and service elements. All these factors give raise to an enormous
number of possible states which makes conformance testing not feasible
(as for most Internet protocols), so that in the end, many different imple-
mentations and “dialects” of SIP coexist in the network, and they must
be accounted for in devising methods for analyzing SIP traffic and protect
servers and applications. Moreover, the fact outlined above, changes non
marginally the rules of the game in that the characteristics of voice traffic
do not match any more the traditional Erlang models [30,37,169], so a new
understanding of the traffic characteristics for SIP-based services is badly
needed.
Analysis and protection of SIP based services has thus become an active
area of research, as well as the specific actions that can protect the protocol,
or the firewalling techniques specifically devised for it. Hence, this thesis
focuses on the analysis and protection of services based on this protocol.
We note that most, if not all, of this thesis deals with SIP-based VoIP
application though an extension of the security framework proposed in
this thesis is possible for other SIP based multimedia services.
Due to the open architecture of the Internet, heterogeneous environment
and real time communication constraint of SIP based VoIP networks, de-
veloping efficient, flexible and adaptive security oriented approaches is a
severe challenge. For example, inspite of conceptual similarities between
spam email and calls (e.g., SPIT), many effective email spam prevention
methods are not applicable at all in anti-SPIT system. Indeed, both email
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spam and SPIT have the same underlying motive, i.e., financial profit.
Attackers, in both cases, use the Internet as the means to target users
and deliver their attacks (messages). Additionally, spam and SPIT share
similar kinds of attack ideas and methods, such as automatic generation
of bulk messages for cost reduction, impersonation of end users’ addresses,
harvesting addresses, as well as dictionary attacks. Considering above sim-
ilarities, researchers adopt and apply effective anti-email-spam techniques
for managing SPIT. Inspite of the similarities, SPIT is a much bigger threat
for users than email spam due to the different nature of the SPAM and
SPIT. The main difference between SPAM and SPIT is that spam e-mail
is transmitted asynchronously, while SPIT uses real-time communication.
A SPIT call makes the phone ringing and disturbs the callee. On the other
hand, email SPAM can be queued in the email program of the receiving
user without disturbing the user until he looks at it. Unsolicited commu-
nications (such as, SPIT) are, from a signaling point of view, technically
correct transactions. It is not possible to distinguish from the INVITE
message if such a transaction is SPIT or not. From a technical point of
view the challenge is even more complicated since a spam call must be
identified before call establishment, while, the content is not available to
help the detection until the phone rings (disturbing the user) and the callee
answers the call.
The research community has been investigating the best ways of attack
detection and protection for the VoIP services for the last decade. Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDSs) [6, 124, 133] are considered an effective technol-
ogy to protect target systems and networks against malicious activities.
IDS is a well-known concept in the field of security of IP based networks
as a second line of defense behind standard security mechanisms (e.g., au-
thentication, access control and cryptography) to detect violations of the
security policies. Intrusion detection is the process of monitoring network
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traffic (e.g., the network and application protocol activity) for particular
network segments or devices to identify suspicious activity such as mal-
ware (e.g., worms, spyware), malicious users gaining unauthorized access
to services, and authorized users of services who misuse their privileges
or attempt to gain additional unauthorized privileges. Traditionally, IDSs
are broadly classified into two groups based on their working principles: (i)
misuse-detection system which monitors activity with precise descriptions
of known malicious behavior, and, (ii) anomaly-detection system (ADS)
which identifies intrusion considering the notion of normal activity of the
network. Though misuse-detection systems ensures higher performance
for known attacks, they are not effective for detection of new attacks and
requires constant update of attack information. While, anomaly-based in-
trusion detection techniques [62, 112, 187] are widely used for detection of
both known and novel attacks. ADSs are based on the beliefs that an
intruder’s behavior will be noticeably different from that of a legitimate
user. Anomaly-based IDS detects anomalies by searching the deviation
from normal activities due to deferent attacks, misconfiguration of net-
work components, network failures etc.
Research on ADSs is gaining importance due to the increasing threats
toward VoIP systems. Research attempts focusing ADSs for multime-
dia/VoIP applications is still in the early phase as VoIP networks are still
relatively new in comparison to IP networks. In the context of VoIP do-
main, special attention should be given in the design and deployment of
ADSs as most of the ADSs dedicated for detecting traffic in the TCP/IP
traffic may not be efficient for VoIP network due to complex and hetero-
geneous architecture of VoIP systems and real-time nature of the VoIP
application.
In this thesis, we focus on an in-depth analysis of the SIP-based VoIP
services to obtain a solid insight of the network and service behavior. This
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information helps us to design and implement of a filtering architecture
for SIP based VoIP networks where the incoming network data is captured
and inspected on-line for detecting on-going attacks or malicious activities.
1.5 Structure of the Thesis and Contributions
A general overview of how the problems we tackle in this thesis fit together,
as well as how they lead to the organization of our text, is depicted in this
section.
Chapter 2 reviews the state-of-the-art in vulnerability of SIP-based VoIP
services and countermeasures that has been proposed so far in the literature
to tackle the security risks in the context of VoIP network.
Chapter 3 outlines the methodological approach we follow for analyzing
and protection of SIP based services.
Chapter 4 introduces a knowledge base defined as “VoIP-Onto”, a formal
conceptual model of VoIP threat domain considering the semantic relation-
ship among security threats, attacks and countermeasures, with the aim to
exchange a common vocabulary about the security related information of
the VoIP domain. “VoIP-Onto” can be used as a general vocabulary, road
map, and extensible dictionary for sharing domain knowledge about taxon-
omy of VoIP attack and guidelines of counter measures. This contribution
is summarized in Chapter 4.
Chapter 5 points out the issues and challenges of collecting real-world
VoIP traffic for the purpose of testing security monitoring and controlling
tools. The process we adopt for capturing and anonymization of real world
SIP traffic is discussed in Section 5.1. This Chapter also presents our
research work in generation of synthetic traffic, introducing “VoIPTG”
which is a flexible and generic traffic simulator and “SIP-Msg-Gen” which
is a SIP message fuzzer. “VoIPTG” is capable to imitate real-world VoIP
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traffic (e.g., call detail records) following various possible models of VoIP
systems with a special attention to characterize the sophisticated behavior
of VoIP users. This contribution is summarized in Section 5.3. “SIP-
Msg-Gen” is a state-full and context aware simulator which is capable of
generating both “good” and “bad” SIP messages. This contribution is
outlined in Section 5.2.
Chapter 6 presents our research work in conformance and security anal-
ysis of SIP messages, proposing a multi-stage filtering architecture to ad-
dress the challenges of filtering “erroneous” SIP messages with different
structure, contents and timing. The first stage of the multi-stage filtering
system is a straightforward lexical analyzer to weed out the SIP messages
with syntax error, while, the remaining three filters follow supervised ma-
chine learning techniques to detect harmful SIP messages with semantic
errors by learning from previous experiences. The experimental results of
this filtering system look very promising and are presented in Section 6.2.
Chapter 7 summarizes the analysis of VoIP traffic with the aim to under-
stand the normal behavior of the network and users. The notion of social
network is applied in the context of SIP based VoIP network, where social
networks of VoIP users are built based on their telephone records. Then,
Social Network Analysis (SNA) techniques are applied on these social net-
work of VoIP users to explore their social behavioral patterns. Section 7.3
presents the impact and use of the knowledge about the social interac-
tion pattern of VoIP users in problem diagnosis, intruders detection, and
security protection of IP telephony.
Finally, concluding remarks and insights about future possible research
directions are provided in Chapter 8.
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State of the Art
This chapter reports various security issues and challenges in VoIP infras-
tructure, and presents a discussion on security solutions and countermea-
sures adopted by researchers and vendors to ensure secure deployment and
operation of VoIP applications.
2.1 VoIP Attack Taxonomy
Despite the use of security mechanisms, SIP based VoIP services are still
subject to certain vulnerabilities [63]. A good starting point for design-
ing and deployment of effective countermeasures is to understand different
vulnerabilities and security threats to VoIP domain and how they are ex-
ploited to launch different attacks. This section provides a taxonomy of
the different types of security threats to VoIP deployments, services, and
end users.
There are various categorizations and taxonomies of VoIP specific at-
tacks exist in literature based on the different viewpoints and consideration
of researchers. The Voice over IP Security Alliance (VoIPSA) [206] has cre-
ated an enormous classification for VoIP threats and attacks, which is an
important contribution to understand the associated threats. But that
taxonomy is a very complete one (as it takes into account also threats
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not caused by VoIP-specific technical reasons) for practical VoIP secu-
rity analysis. A similar taxonomy is presented in IETF draft [131] where
threats only caused by VoIP-specific technical reasons are considered. Au-
thor of [101] examines the current state of affairs on VoIP security through
a survey of 221 known/disclosed security vulnerabilities in bug-tracking
databases and presents a comprehensive survey of the state of the art in
VoIP security research covering 245 related research papers. This book
supports the taxonomy described in the IETF draft [131].
A different taxonomy is defined in [24,121] where each security threat is
classified regarding its compromise on the information security attributes,
i.e., Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA). In the telephony do-
main, confidentiality threats generally refer to the exposure of the commu-
nication (e.g, content of the conversation, information about call such as
telephone numbers dialed, call duration, etc) between two parties, integrity
threat refers to the unauthorized access and modification to the commu-
nication services (e.g., identity of the caller, the message, the identity of
the recipient, or the call record logs). Availability threat indicates com-
promising the availability of the service or degrading the quality level of
such resources. Though classification of attacks based on CIA are widely
accepted, according to [184] this type of categorization is not suitable for
defining a taxonomy due to the fact that a taxonomy should be unique and
many vulnerabilities should not belong to several categories at the same
time.
In this work, we follow the VoIP attack taxonomy proposed in the IETF
draft [131] where the security threats can be categorized in four areas as
discussed in the following subsections. For the time being, we limit the
scope of our discussion on vulnerabilities, threats and attacks of VoIP
domain specific to SIP protocol.
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2.1.1 Interruption of Service Threats
Attacks of this category target network bandwidth, server capacity or ser-
vice quality. This category mainly includes the Denial of Service (DoS)
attacks that aim at denying or degrading a legitimate user’s access to a
service or network resource, or at bringing down the servers offering such
services. An overview of different types of possible DoS attacks in SIP
based VoIP services is explained in [173]. VoIP is more susceptible to DoS
attacks than regular Internet services due to the real time transmission of
the messages [89]. DoS attacks can be launched in distributed fashion and
directed to different entities (e.g., servers and end-users) depending on the
attackers’ intension. A list of the well-known DoS attacks in SIP based
VoIP services is found below:
• Fuzzy SIP Messages -
Fuzzy SIP messages are all those messages that do not belong to a
valid, correct and legitimate SIP session. They can be generated when
SIP protocol implementations or applications do not fully comply with
the standards or they contain errors in the implementation code. In
addition, attackers can intelligently manipulate SIP messages to take
advantage of the existing security problems in the target system, or
to exploit SIP weak points.
Due to the text format of messages of the SIP protocol, “fuzzy” mes-
sages can be easily generated. As a matter of fact, there are endless
ways to manipulate SIP messages: they can be just malformed in the
sense that they do not comply with the grammar [156] prescribed by
the protocol or they could be syntactically well formed but contain-
ing semantic errors. An example of malformed SIP message is found
in Fig. 2.1 in which a valid receiver address is missing. Generally,
the server receiving this message should simply respond with a “Bad
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Request” indication and discard the message; however, under certain
circumstances, the server may then fail to process further messages or
it could get stuck altogether.
Via:SIP/2.0/UDP pc33.server1.com;branch=z9hG4bK776
To :  user2 <sip:user2@server2.com> 
From :  user1 <sip: user1@server1.com>;tag=19283017
Call-ID : a84b4c76e66710@pc33.server1.com
CSeq :  312159 
INVITE sip: null SIP/2.0
INVITE
Max-Forwards : 70
Contact :  null
Figure 2.1: An example of a SIP message with syntax error
SIP messages that are syntactically well-formed may still contain se-
mantic errors. These messages may have no meaning, cannot be
interpreted, are ambiguous, lead to a deadlock, etc. For example,
Fig. 2.2 shows a SIP message with an unknown request method, an
unknown URI scheme in the Request-URI, missing mandatory header
field (Call-ID), scalar fields with overlarge values and multiple entries
for headers that ought to be specified only once (like the From header).
The message is syntactically valid but a server receiving this message
will fail to process it and may perform time-consuming analyses to
determine the request message type and acquire the information that
are necessary to route and process the request.
In addition, attackers can manipulate SIP messages by entering mean-
ingless or wrong information in various fields of a message to take
advantage of existing security problems in the target system or to
carry out different kinds of attacks. Again, a malicious user can inject
SQL code into a well-formed SIP message that may damage the sys-
tem (e.g., updating or deleting entry in table containing user account
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Via:SIP/2.0/UDP pc33.server1.com;branch=z9hG4bK776
To :  user2 <sip:user2@server2.com> 
From :  user1 <sip: user1@server1.com>;tag=19283017
CSeq :  312159 
Contact :  sip:user1@pc33.server1.com
NewMethod unknown: unknown-uri  SIP/2.0
NewMethod
From :  user3 <sip: user3@server3.com>;tag=1485717
Max-Forwards : 7593
Figure 2.2: An example of syntactically well-formed SIP message with semantic error
information) when executed on the server [64]. Fig. 2.3 shows an ex-
ample of SIP message with injected SQL code by a malicious user
with the intention of gaining unauthorized access of the SIPs proxy
database (e.g. the registration database).
Via:SIP/2.0/UDP pc33.server1.com;branch=z9hG4bK776
Max-Forwards : 70
To :  user2 <sip:user2@server2.com> 
From :  user1 <sip: user1@server1.com>;tag=19283017
Call-ID : a84b4c76e66710@pc33.server1.com
CSeq :  3121 
Contact :  sip:user1@pc33.server1.com
INVITE sip:user2@server2.com SIP/2.0
INVITE
Authorization:Digest username="malicious'; 
Update subscriber set first_name='malicious' where 
username='malicious'
--realm="195.251.164.23",  algorithm="md5"
Figure 2.3: An example of a SIP message tampering by injecting SQL code
• Flooding Attack -
A common DoS attack scenario in SIP based VoIP is message flooding
attack where malicious users send huge number of INVITE/REGISTER
request messages to the SIP server (or any SIP entity), thus, the target
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system becomes so busy processing call requests from the malicious
users that it is unable to process legitimate call requests. Legitimate
packets will either be ignored or processed so slowly that the VoIP
service is unusable.
Flooding attacks can also occur with the existence of authentication
mechanisms. In such scenario, after receiving INVITE/REGISTER
requests messages the proxy/registrar responds with a challenge and
waits for the request to be send again with the proper authentication
credentials. The attacker can send INVITE/REGISTER messages
and then stop handshaking process. Two types of flooding attack
scenarios are usually observed:
– INVITE Flooding Attack:
Malicious users generate INVITE Flood attack by sending a large
number of SIP INVITE messages to a SIP server. With this
form of attack, the SIP server remains so busy processing these
false INVITE messages from the attacker, that it will not be able
to process call requests from legitimate users. Fig. 2.4 shows an
example of SIP INVITE message flooding attack scenario.
– REGISTER Flooding Attack:
One of the cardinal network elements in SIP based VoIP infras-
tructure is the Registrar server that accepts the SIP registration
requests from user agents. A SIP REGISTER request adds a new
binding between a user’s SIP address and one or more contact
addresses (currently IP addresses) so that the user can utilize the
provided telephony service. When an attacker manages to par-
alyze the registrar (e.g., by sending numerous bogus registration
requests), it can easily cause a DoS attack. A malicious user at-
tacks a Registrar server by sending a large number of registration
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INVITE
INVITE
100 Trying
180 Ringing
180 Ringing
200 OK
200 OK
ACK ACK
Media  Session
200 OK 200 OK
BYE BYE
User
 Agent SIP Proxy 
User
 Agent
INVITE
INVITE
INVITE
INVITE
INVITE
INVITE
INVITE
INVITE
Attacker
Figure 2.4: An example of a SIP INVITE message flooding attack
request (e.g., SIP REGISTER messages) with the aim to guess le-
gitimate users’ password or to degrade and delay the registration
process of the server. This situation can be avoided by blocking
messages coming from unknown origins.
Fig. 2.5 depicts such an attack scenario against a SIP registrar
server.
• Call Hijacking - Call Hijacking happens when the attacker uses SIP
messages (e.g., 301 Moved Temporarily) in order to hijack an exist-
ing call towards other proxy/endpoint, it is needed that the attacker
replicates the proper SIP header for the hijacking to be successful.
• Call Teardown - Call Teardown happens when the attacker uses SIP
messages (e.g. CANCEL/BYE) order to tear down an existing call by
replicating the proper SIP header of the existing call.
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Figure 2.5: An example of flooding attack against SIP Register Server
– CANCEL Denial of Service Attack:
The CANCEL attack refers to the unauthorized tear down of
an non-established call between two user agents. The CANCEL
request method is used to terminate pending searches or call at-
tempts. Specifically, it asks the UAS to cease the request pro-
cessing and generate an error response to the request. It can be
generated either by a user agent or the proxy servers while the
call establishment is in progress.
Fig. 2.6 depicts an CANCEL dos attack scenario. Here, in order
to initiate a new call user agent A sent an INVITE request mes-
sage to user agent B. Upon receiving the INVITE message B’s SIP
proxy receive sends back an “100 Trying” response indicating that
it is processing the call request. When B’s phone starts ringing,
a “180 Ringing” is sent back to notify A that the call establish-
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ment is in progress. At this time, an attacker can easily send
INVITE
INVITE
100 Trying
180 Ringing
180 Ringing
CANCEL
No More Pendings
200 0k
User Agent
      A SIP Proxy 
User Agent
      B
100 Trying
   
Attacker
Figure 2.6: An example of CANCEL dos attack
a spoofed CANCEL message to the server. Without proper au-
thentication, the server cannot differentiate the spoofed CANCEL
message from the genuine one and considers that the CANCEL
request is coming either from user agent A or B. Upon receiving
the CANCEL message the server tear down the call establishment
process between user agents A and B.
– BYE Denial of Service Attack:
An established media session between two user agents is termi-
nated upon receiving a BYE message from either of them. It is
an end-to-end message sent by user agents participating in the
session. The BYE attack refers to the unauthorized tear down of
an established call between user agents. Fig. 2.7 depicts an BYE
dos attack scenario. Here, a call is established between UA A and
UA B with three-way handshake process (INVITE-200 OK- ACK
message). Suddenly, a malicious user sends a BYE message to
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either UAs, A or B. The receiving UA may not differentiate the
spoofed BYE message from a genuine one and will prematurely
teardown the established call assuming that it is requested by the
partner UA.
INVITE
INVITE
100 Trying
180 Ringing
180 Ringing
200 OK
200 OK
ACK
ACK
Media  Session
200 OK
200 OK
User Agent
      A SIP Sever 
User Agent
      B
Attacker
BYE
Figure 2.7: An example of BYE dos attack
2.1.2 Abuse of Service Threats
Service abuse threats and attacks cover the improper use of VoIP services,
especially (but not exclusively) in those situations where such services are
offered in a commercial setting. Examples of such threats include fraud
and billing avoidance which can be simply described as the use of VoIP
telephony services without any intention of paying.
• Toll Fraud - The term “Toll Fraud” is used if a person generates
costs (toll) by using a hijacked extension. In this case, an attacker
can impersonate a valid user/IP phone and use the VoIP network for
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making free long distance calls. Example of toll fraud is the hacking
of a company’s phone system by a third party.
This kind of fraud has certain characteristics that make it particu-
larly attractive to fraudsters. The main one is that the danger of
localization is small. This is because all actions are performed from a
distance, which in con- junction with the mess topology and the size of
networks makes the process of localization time-consuming and expen-
sive. Additionally, no particularly sophisticated equipment is needed.
The simple knowledge of an access code, which can be acquired even
with methods of social engineering, makes the implementation of fraud
feasible.
• Session Replay - In this attack the past session of another user
can be replayed by the attacker to have access to the unauthorized
resources.
2.1.3 Interception and Modification Threats
Interception, and modification threats cover situations where an adversary
unlawfully and without authorization can listen or modify the signaling
data or the content of a VoIP session. Eavesdropping and Man-in-the-
Middle attacks can be categorized into this area. Examples of such attacks
include Traffic capture, Number harvesting, Call black holing, Call rerout-
ing, Conversation alteration, Conversation degrading etc.
2.1.4 Social Threats
Social threats are attacks ranging from the false representation of infor-
mation together with generation of unsolicited communications with the
aim to simply disturb users and even to steal private information. Social
threats are aimed directly against humans, these threats are classified as
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social since the term unsolicited is strictly bound to user-specification pref-
erences. This makes this kind of attack difficult to identify. Examples of
social attacks are:
• SPIT - SPam over Internet Telephony (SPIT) commonly refers to the
transmission of unsolicited voice messages with telemarketing, phish-
ing or fraud goals. A SIP call SPAM application is easy to write,
most of the cases spam calls are generated by machines (bot-nets)
programmed. For example, a SIP UA can initiate a large number of
calls in parallel. If a call connects, the SPAM application generates
an ACK and proceeds to play out a recorded announcement, and then
it terminates the call. This kind of application can be built entirely
in software, using readily available off-the-shelf software components.
It can run on a low-end PC and requires no special expertise to exe-
cute [155].
• VoIP Pishing/ Vishing - The term vishing refers to the phishing in
VoIP domain. In general, phishing is about masquerading as a trust-
worthy third party in an attempt to acquire confidential information
from victims. In the context of VoIP, an attacker presents false or mis-
leading credentials by impersonating a valid user/enterprise over the
phone in order to gain access to personal and financial information.
Again, the attacker can make the callee dialing expensive numbers
in order to get the promised prize or to collect his/her personal data
by redirecting the user towards an Interactive Voice Responder (IVR)
pretended to be trusted.
2.2 VoIP Security Testing Tool
A number of competing independent implementations of SIP based ser-
vices with distinct configurable parameters and design choices coexist in
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the network. Not all of them are completely stable and are susceptible
to attacks where malicious uses try to discover possible security flaws by
exploiting the weakness of the applications. These applications should be
undergone a full security assessment in the development phase in order to
discover vulnerabilities and flaws in implementation and configuration.
Testing of SIP based services is complicated due to the complex and
stateful nature of the protocol; however, different approaches have been
adopted by various researchers and vendors to test basic functionality and
to verify proper protocol implementation in SIP based equipment. VoIPSA
provides a categorical list of the available commercial and open source VoIP
security testing tools2. Authors of [121] make an attempt to evaluate the
capabilities of few available VoIP security tools to detect potential security
threats.
A set of SIP messages defined as “SIP Torture Test Messages” is released
as an IETF-draft [177]. This draft does not contain a comprehensive list
of unusual, but valid, messages, instead, it focuses on the scenarios that
should be handled properly before deployment of SIP services. It defines
42 valid and invalid messages, describes them and gives directions on how
the SIP application should react.
Fuzzing, a well-known test technique to find vulnerabilities in different
applications, is also used in SIP-based VoIP application for security testing.
In the context of SIP based services, fuzzing refers to the automated way
to test the robustness and security of the implemented applications using
SIP protocol by providing invalid, unexpected or random data to the SIP
traffic. “Snooze” [11] is a tool for building flexible, security-oriented and
stateful network protocol fuzzers to effiectively identify security flaws in
network protocol implementations. The authors build a prototype of this
2VoIP Security Tool List, VoIP Security Alliance (VOIPSA),
http://www.voipsa.org/Resources/tools.php
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tool to perform fuzzing of SIP based applications. A framework for SIP
security testing is proposed in [178]. This tool consists of (i) a fuzzing
unit to craft malicious SIP messages, and (ii) a DoS attack simulator to
spoof any given range of usernames and IP addresses. “KiF”, a stateful
fuzzer, is proposed in [1] to detect failures and bugs in the implementations
of SIP based services. SIP messages are generated with the help of a
syntax fuzzer and the state protocol evaluator. The syntax fuzzer is uses
the domain knowledge of SIP which is represented by the Context-Free
grammar ABNF, while, the state machine is used to model the transitions
in the system.A state-aware for application layer protocol is proposed in
[107]. The functionality relies mostly on user defined scenarios which are
specified in XML.
To test the robustness of SIP implementation, the authors of [201] pre-
pared a test material and carried out tests against a sample set of existing
implementations. The test suit consists of crafted SIP messages containing
exceptional elements to provoke undesired behavior in the implementation.
An exceptional element is an input that might not have been considered
properly when implementing the application. The robustness of a SIP im-
plementation is measured here by the ability of a application to withstand
exceptional input and stressful conditions.
A few attack simulators are available to aid the security and confor-
mance testing of SIP based VoIP services. A list1 of VoIP security related
resources contains the security tools and attack simulators that are demon-
strated by the author of [48] to test security of VoIP applications. “VoIP
bots” [128]) is a VoIP security tool supporting a wide set of attacks ranging
from SPIT to DDoS. It is created to show how attacks can be launched
against VoIP/SIP services and users in a remotely and distributed manner.
1Hacking Exposed VoIP, http://www.hackingvoip.com/tools.html
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“Sipvicious”2 is an open source attack simulator containins several small
tools; (i) a sip scanner, (ii) a tool to find active SIP accounts with REGIS-
TER messages, and (iii) an online password cracker for SIP PBX. “SIPp”3
is a open Source traffic generator for the SIP protocol. It generates traffic
by repeating call flow scenarios described in custom XML, hence it is con-
venient for benchmarking and assessing stress conditions at SIP servers. It
includes a few basic SipStone user agent scenarios (UAC - Client and UAS
- Server) and establishes and releases multiple calls with the INVITE and
BYE methods. “ SIPp-DD” is a flooding attack simulation tool for imi-
tating real life distributed denial of service attack. It modifies and extends
the open source traffic generator “SIPp” to simulate attack.
A tool for customizing and generating synthetic VoIP traffic within con-
trolled environments is proposed in [193]. This tool is capable of simulating
customize VoIP traffic; the normal traffic is generated by profiled emulated
users based on a social model. The attack traffic is based on currently
available VoIP assessment tools.
“SIPr”4 is an open source SIP application testing framework. It can
create complex and converged SIP application call flows.
2.3 Attack Detection & Protection of SIP Services
The security issue of SIP based services becomes apparent with the increase
of the popularity of these services. Though combination of strong access
control and encryption policies can be a good approach to protect attacks
against SIP based services, ensuring these policies is hardly scalable in the
highly open and dynamic architecture of the Internet. The IETF has made
several improvements that provide protection for the VoIP signaling and
2“Sipvicious”, https://code.google.com/p/sipvicious/
3“SIPp”,http://sipp.sourceforge.net/
4http://www.agnity.com/sipper/index.php
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media streams. Due to the overheads of implementation and performance
these security mechanisms have not been fully implemented and deployed
in current VoIP applications. Moreover, existing security solutions are not
efficient to cope with the increasing sophisticated large-scale attacks and
malwares situations in SIP based services. As a result, intrusion detection
systems (IDS) have become an indispensable component of security infras-
tructure to detect intrusion or anomalous behavior that passes the existing
security policies.
Due to the different nature and content of attacks, their detection meth-
ods are also different. Thus, researchers and vendors are investigating vari-
ous approaches of assuring different security aspects [20,86,97,127,129,202].
This section focuses on papers that highlight the different approaches
adopted by various researchers for VoIP traffic analysis and intrusion de-
tection in the context of SIP. A survey of VoIP security domain is found
in [101] covering 245 VoIP security research papers and books.
2.3.1 Defense against Interruption of Service
Interruption of services such as DoS attacks are serious threats for SIP
VoIP infrastructures [109]. An extensive overview of the recent attempts
to detect SIP-based Dos attacks is found in [45,63].
Detection of SIP malformed message
A specific “signature” considering the syntax of well-formed SIP message
defined in the IETF standard of SIP protocol RFC 3261 [156] is defined
in [65] and [113]. Any message that does not comply with that “signa-
ture” is considered as malformed and discarded. An intrusion detection
system for SIP-based VoIP system utilizing rule matching algorithm and
state transition models is proposed in [168]. Authors of [65] and [168]
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point out that the rules of SIP messages defined in RFC 3261 [156] can-
not cover all kinds of malformed SIP messages (for example, it does not
define any range for scalar fields) and hence [168] has proposed an ex-
tension to RFC 3261 by introducing additional rules to make it (more)
secure. Generally, such signature-based intrusion/anomaly detection sys-
tems work well when no entirely new, uncataloged attacks occur and the
“attack signatures” database is not huge. However, handling of intru-
sion/anomalous detection problem in the context of SIP with a table-drive
approach (rule/signature database) is destined to run up against the com-
binatorial explosion, as there are endless ways of forming a malformed
or malicious message. Again, there are multiple ways of structuring a
correct SIP message. Other researchers have proposed machine learning
techniques for SIP messages analysis, like in [81, 129, 144, 152] where the
anomalous content is identified by parsing SIP messages. A self-learning
anomaly detection system is proposed in [152] which emphasizes the de-
tection of unknown and novel attacks. Here, incoming SIP messages are
mapped into feature spaces and the anomaly detection model is trained
using normal/well-formed SIP traffic. Anomalous messages are identified
as those whose Euclidean distance from those in the model of normal-
ity is higher than a given threshold. [81], however, reports that classifiers
based on Euclidean distance computation do not produce adequate results
for well-crafted malicious messages that differ very slightly from normal
messages and hence its authors suggest a classifier based on Levenshtein
distance [75] to measure the similarity between good and bad SIP mes-
sages.
Detection of SIP flooding attack
A two-layer attack detection and protection architecture for SIP based
VoIP services is proposed in [47] to handle different types of attacks, in-
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cluding request flooding and malformed message sending. The authors con-
figure “Snort” [154], a widely used open source network intrusion detection
and prevention system, with a set of rules for detection of flooding attacks
on SIP infrastructures. [137, 207] implement a large-scale, rule-based SIP-
aware application-layer-firewall capable of detecting and mitigating SIP-
based Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks at the signaling and media levels.
Different statistical methods are used in [76,149,164,182] to model the
normal traffic flow of a network. If the observed behaviors significantly
deviate from the normal traffic flow then it is suspected that the system
is under flooding attack. Authors of [76] analyze SIP traffic flow to ex-
tract features describing the statistics and behavior of the flow and uses
them for detecting distributed dos attacks. Change-point method is used
in [149,151,208] to detect changes in network traffic which leads to flooding
attacks. The change-point detection method employs a statistical analysis
on the correlation between the number of connection establishment at-
tempts and the completed handshakes to detect very subtle traffic changes
from SIP protocol behavior. Authors of [164] and [182] use Hellinger dis-
tance (HD) to detect flooding attacks. Hellinger distance [132], a met-
ric that quantifies the deviation between two probability measures, de-
tects flooding attack scenario by observing the difference in probability
distributions from normal traffic. [164] considers the normal distribution
of the call establishment (INVITE-200 OK-ACK SIP messages) and tear-
down (BYE/CANCEL-200 OK SIP messages) in a system. Here, the at-
tack threshold i.e. the calculated Hellinger distance value is dynamically
adapted based on previous monitored network parameters.
Protocol state machines based IDS are proposed in [29, 46, 163, 167]
where state machines provide the protocol design in term of desirable and
undesirable protocol states and state transitions, and classify a deviation
from normal behavior as a suspicious attack. To detect INVITE flooding
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attacks and BYE DoS attack authors of [163, 167] models the legitimate
state transitions of SIP-based call setup and teardown process. Instead of
collecting and deriving the call state and protocol dependent information
from the packets, [167] utilizes the state machines of network protocols and
the interaction among them for intrusion detection. The state transitions
are triggered either by the arrival of packets or the internal interaction
between protocol state machines.
A formal method based on Coloured Petri Nets [92] to design a SIP
INVITE flooding attack detection framework is proposed in [116] and [43].
A distributed filtering architecture is designed in [88] to protect SIP devices
against large scale flooding DoS attacks. A defense architecture against
SIP Distributed-DoS floods based upon a redirection mechanism and a
combination of source and destination traffic filtering is proposed in [179].
[3] proposes a real-time attack classification system using Naive Bayes and
decision trees to detect application layer SIP flood attacks. A bloom filter
based monitor for detection of flooding attack is proposed in [68].
2.3.2 Defense against Abuse of Service
Fraud in telephony service is the biggest example of abuse of service as
it causes a substantial loss of annual revenue for many telecommunication
companies throughout the world [18]. Fraud detection in the telecommu-
nications industry requires the identification of a small fraction of fraudu-
lent calls from the high volume of call traffic. This presents a significant
research challenge in the design of efficient and effective fraud detection
architecture. Diverse techniques are adopted by researchers for the pre-
vention and early detection of fradulent activity in VoIP domain, such as
signature-based [50, 157], rule-based systems [83, 85, 158], behavior profil-
ing [157], Artificial Intelligence techniques like neural networks or decision
trees [22,123,183], statistical methods [204], Gaussian mixture model [183],
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Bayesian networks [183], visual interface [34], machine learning [84] and
data mining techniques [52]. A brief discussion of the fraud problem in
VoIP networks and evaluation of the related available solutions is found
in [72]. [148] presents a survey of the anti-fraud solutions proposed in var-
ious areas, and their usability in the VoIP context.
Some of the major fraud schemes and the techniques used to address
them is discussed in [13].
Authors of [157] and [4] propose to obtain a signature of normal network
behavior from historical calling activity. This signature helps to distinguish
between normal and fraudulent usage of the VoIP services. Latent Dirich-
let Allocation (LDA) is applied in [134,204] to build user profile signatures
and assumes that any significant unexplainable deviations from the normal
activity of an individual user is strongly correlated with fraudulent activ-
ity. The user activity is represented as a probability distribution over call
features which surmises the user’s calling behavior. This probability dis-
tribution is derived from LDA which can accurately describe user profiles
by combining different classes of distributions. To score calls the authors
compare the likelihood of the user generating a call versus a fraudster gen-
erating the same call.
A rule-based expert system is presented in [83] which aims to the de-
tection of superimposed fraud cases in the telecommunications network of
a large organization. Rules are induced by both using the network admin-
istrator’s expert knowledge and by applying data mining methods on real
world data.
An application of supervised and unsupervised learning approaches to
telecommunications fraud detection is proposed in [84]. An unsupervised
neural network approach [22] and data mining approach [52] are found to
profile the behavior of mobile phone users for the use in fraud detection.
Authors of [183] performed experiments with three different methods
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to detect illegitimate usage of communication networks. Firstly, a feed-
forward neural network based on supervised learning is used to learn a
discriminative function to classify subscribers using summary statistics.
Secondly, a Gaussian mixture model is used to model the probability den-
sity of subscribers’ past behavior so that the probability of current behav-
ior can be calculated to detect any abnormalities from the past behavior.
Lastly, Bayesian networks are used to describe the statistics of a particular
user and the statistics of different fraud scenarios.
2.3.3 Defense against Social Threat
Defense against social threat mainly refers to protection from SPIT (Spam
over Internal Telephony). SPIT is considered the equivalent of email spam
in VoIP environments delivered by means of voice calls. Thus, most of
the approaches introduced so far for managing SPIT actually adopt and
apply anti-email-spam techniques. Due to the real time communication
constraint of SPIT calls, many effective email spam prevention methods
are not effective at all in anti-SPIT system.
A survey of proposed anti-SPIT techniques proposed by researchers
in recent years and evaluation of their effectiveness is found in [71, 118].
Rosenberg et al. [155] examines the various possible solutions that have
been discussed for email and consider their applicability to spam call de-
tection in SIP based VoIP services in an IETF draft RFC 5039.
Content Filtering
The most effective techniques of email spam protection content filtering
where the content of messages is analyzed to characterize them as spam or
not. Unfortunately, this type of spam filtering, while successful for email
spam, is not effective for call spam due to the real time communication
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nature of VoIP communication. An analysis of the audio content is not ap-
propriate since the call in question is already established when audio data
are available. Furthermore, automatic methods based on speech recogni-
tion are currently too complex and language dependent to be deployed for
VoIP calls.
This technique, however, can be used for off-line spam call detection
such as detection of voice spam from subscribers voice mailbox proposed
in [90]. For this purpose, the authors of [90] develop a speaker independent
speech recognition system based on Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) [194]
algorithm to make comparison of speech messages. A content analysis
based SPIT detection and prevention method is proposed in [180]. Here, a
robust audio fingerprint of spectral feature vectors is computed for incom-
ing audio data. New calls are compared with these audio fingerprints to
detect spam calls.
Black, white and grey lists
Use of black and white lists is a simple and straight forward techniques
for preventing email spam. Generally, the black list of a user contains
the contact addresses of undesired callers. White lists are the opposite of
black lists, it is a list of valid callers (e.g., family members, friends and
collegues, etc) that a user is willing to accept call from. Unfortunately,
the effectiveness of the black and white lists is limited for detection of
SIP spam calls. Malicious users can easily pick a new caller ID to avoid
the black list and white lists are susceptible to address spoofing though a
strong identity authentication mechanism can prevent that problem. Use
of a special list named gray list for SPIT detection is proposed in [171].
They proposed a Progressive Multi Grey-Levelling (PMG) mechanism that
monitors call patterns and assigns a gray level to each caller based on
the past call patterns for a specific window. If the gray level is higher
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than a certain threshold, the call is deemed SPIT and the caller blocked.
Enhanced Progressive Multi Grey-Leveling (EPMG) is proposed in [17] for
gray listing.
Payment at risk/Charging-based
SIP based VoIP services has become very attractive for spammer to trans-
mit unsolicited calls as it allows lows cost telephony. Considering this,
payment at risk technique is proposed by researchers where the idea is to
affect the spammer financially. Forcing the spammers pay for each call will
certainly reduce the volume of spam as the sending expenses will be higher
and might exceed the achieved benefit. A possible scenario of payment at
risk approach is described in [155], when a user X sends to user Y, user X
deposits a small amount of money into users Y account. If user Y decides
that the message is not spam, user Y refunds this money back to user X. If
the message is spam, user Y keeps the money. A charged based spam call
prevention framework is designed in [150]. However, building a charging
model to support this technique and defines who collects the money and
what are the payment policies is also a complex task. As a result.
Challenge-Response Based
By utilizing an automated procedure (i.e., bot) spammers can easily gen-
erate a huge amount of spam calls. A known way to protect SPIT from
automated calling machines is Challenge-Response where the call is only
established if the caller can prove that he/she is a human and not a bot.
This is performed by Turing test [195] or Computational Puzzles where the
caller is given a challenge, that a human can solve easily and that is hard
to solve for a machine.
Hidden Turing tests is applied in [143] to received calls and compare
them to typical human communication patterns (e.g., pauses between con-
47
CHAPTER 2. STATE OF THE ART
versations, etc.) for distinguishing humans from automated calling ma-
chines. Authors of [104] proposed a technique using the text-based Turing
test and demonstrated its compatibility with the SIP protocol. Authors
of [176] evaluate existing audio CAPTCHA (Completely Automated Pub-
lic Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart) and suggest specific
attributes-requirements that an audio CAPTCHA should meet in order to
be effective. They demonstrate there is no existing implementation among
the set of popular audio CAPTCHA suitable enough for VoIP environ-
ments.
To detect and prevent spam calls from automated machine a challenge-
response concept is discussed in [91] where a SIP Proxy or User Agent
Server can request from a User Agent Client (caller) to compute the so-
lution to a puzzle. The idea is that the process of solving the puzzle will
increase the CPU usage and thus will reduce the number of unsolicited
calls that it can generate.
Reputation Based
This approach is based on the notions of reputation and trust between the
callers and callee in the network. If the level of trust and reputation is above
a pre-defined threshold then the communication is permitted, otherwise it
is rejected. The trust and reputation level can be measured by past com-
munications, information exchange between domains, and feedback from
users. Authors of [74] suggested to build a judgement model to detect SPIT
calls. The model uses the user feedback and integrates the trust with the
reparation to judge a call. Here, trust indicates the authentic measurement
from the callees and reputation indicates the authentic measurement from
the non-callees. A trust mechanisms is proposed in [150] where each SIP
user maintains a reputation list of his friends and a scores them according
to the level of trust. A large social network is constructed by combining
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reputation lists of all the SIP users. This paper proposes that the reputa-
tion lists of the SIP users can be exchanged between SIP providers, though
in reality exchange of information between VoIP providers may not possible
due to user privacy agreement. The SPIT detection mechanism proposed
in this paper is very simple, if a provider does not find any entry for a
user from which a SIP message is received, it requests reputation informa-
tion about this user from the other providers. If all replies are negative,
then the received SIP message is considered as a spam. A collaborative
reputation-based voice spam filter is proposed in [209] where reputation of
a VoIP user is derived from his/her cumulative online duration.
Multistage Scoring Based
“VoIP SEAL” [160] filters SPIT calls by a two-stage decision process: The
first stage has invisible (non-intrusive) modules that analyzes the informa-
tion available before actually answering the call (e.g. the INVITE mes-
sage), while, the second stage is the interacting (intrusive) that interacts
with the caller and/or the callee. Each stage is composed form several
modules, such as Turing tests, white/black list, simultaneous calls, call
rate and URI’s IP/domain correlation, user feedback, etc. Each module of
the first stage contributes a score in [−1, 1], where high score correspond
to a high probability that the call is a SPIT. If the final score is higher
than the lower threshold, then the call passes to the second stage mod-
ules. On the other hand, if the score is higher than the higher threshold,
the call is rejected. The main feature of “VoIP SEAL” is the adoption of
a modular architecture, and the easiness to add and update modules to
respond to new or different kinds of SPIT. Two challenges of efficient de-
ployment of “VoIP SEAL” is described in [15]: (i) the reliance on database
queries makes “VoIP SEAL” hard to adapt it to an online, real-time, oper-
ation, and (ii) the need to store CDRs (Call Detail Records) for a specific
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analysis purpose poses supplementary deployment hurdles. The authors
show that “VoIP SEAL” can be operated accurately by the stream-based
VoIP-stream approach.
A modular simulator is presented in [51] which was built in order to test
effectiveness of the SPIT prevention systems “VoIP SEAL” [160]. Authors
of [122] concentrate specifically on unsolicited calls trying to isolate users
that fall outside expected behaviors.
A multi-stages scoring framework is proposed in [106] which focuses on
modeling of spam callers’ behavior to calculate the SPIT level for man-
agement of the quality of service. Authors of [38] proposed a Voice Spam
Detector (VSD) combining many of the SPIT filtering techniques such
as:(a) presence, (b) traffic pattern, (c) black and white lists, (d) Bayesian
learning, and (e) social networks and reputation.
Social Behavior Profiling
The choice of receiving or rejecting a voice call depends on the social mean-
ing of trust, reputation, friendship of the calling party and their own mood.
That is why, in recent years, researchers are integrating the behavioral as-
pects of human to determine the legitimacy of voice calls.
Authors of [10], [26], [198] and [9] proposed to use duration of calls to
establish social network linkages and global reputations for callers, based
on which call recipients can decide whether the caller is legitimate or not.
While, authors of [7,8] suggested that the computation of reputation should
be two fold; firstly it should not involve user feedback and secondly it
considers other network features in addition to call duration. They use the
similarities and social ties among VoIP users for SPIT detection. The social
ties between users is measured through features like out-degree, number of
repetitive calls, reciprocity and interaction rate. A multi-stage, adaptive
spam filter based on presence (location, mood, time), trust, and reputation
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is described in [108] to detect spam in voice calls.
Call Pattern Profilng
SPIT detection methods using call pattern analysis is proposed in [110,119].
Authors of [110] express call patterns with parameters such as user rela-
tionships, average call duration, and the rate of unsuccessful calls. Authors
of [165,166] presented two approaches for SPIT call detection based on the
distributions of selected call features (i.e., day and time of calling, call
durations etc.)
Knowledge-based Approach
Firewalls to detect SPIT for VoIP devices is designed in [205] and [117]
that uses attack signature to identify call invitations from suspicious user
agents. Authors of [126] addressed the SPIT detection problem using deci-
sion tree. Conceptual models is proposed in [44, 70] to formally described
the SPIT domain. The formal representations included capabilities, such
as modeling the SPIT phenomenon in a SIP-based VoIP environment, a
common understanding of SPIT domain, as well as reusable SPIT-related
knowledge interoperability, aggregation and reasoning. A formal verifi-
cation method for validating the effectiveness of the anti-SPIT system is
found in [175]. A protection system to enable personalized and role-based
SPIT prevention is proposed in [40].
Machine Learning & Data Mining Techniques
Machine learning and data mining techniques [3, 188, 203] are successfully
used for classification of SPIT calls. Authors of [188] proposed a multi-
feature (e.g. call frequency, average call duration, etc) call pattern analy-
sis with unsupervised Random Forests classifier. Wu et al. [203] proposed
detection of SPIT calls through clustering based on the call parameters,
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using optional user feedback for some calls. A semi-supervised learning
algorithm is used here for this clustering process which also considers un-
labeled data. In the context of VoIP, semi-supervised learning algorithms
is very effective as this is free from the laborious and error-prone manual
parameter configuration.
Miscellaneous
Authors of [136] focused on reducing the false negative in SPIT call identi-
fication. The authors discussed that most legitimate calls a person received
are from persons or organizations with strong social ties such as friends,
family, colleagues, etc. Some legitimate calls, however, are from those with
weak social ties such as a restaurant the callee booked a table on-line.
Since a callee’s contact list usually contains only the addresses of persons
or organizations with strong social ties, filtering out unsolicited calls using
the contact list is prone to false positives. After analyzing call logs they
identified that legitimate calls are initiated from persons or organizations
with weak social ties through transactions over the web or email exchanges.
Considering this, they proposed a special mechanism to detect legitimate
calls from person with weak social ties using cross-media relations to prior
contact. In this mechanism, a potential caller offers the callee his contact
addresses which might be used in future calls. On the other hand, a callee
provides a potential caller with weakly-secret information that the caller
can use in future calls in order to be identified as someone the callee has
had prior contact through other means.
Authors of [95] also focused on the performance of a SPIT detection
system. Particularly they concentrated on ways to design SPIT filters with
the two features: (i) performance guarantee (e.g., percentage of mistakes
of the filter in the worst case), and (ii) reduction of manual configuration.
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2.4 Discussion
Due to the different characteristics of attacks a large body of research has
been dedicated to attack-centric solutions. Most of the cases, solutions
designed for detecting one specific attack are not efficiently applicable in
detecting other attacks. For instance, SPIT detection techniques are not
fully suitable for detecting flooding DoS attacks. Thus, the VoIP domain is
in need of a unified platform that is able to detect and protect SIP services
from different attacks.
Threshold based approaches are widely used in recent literature for
detection of attacks. An adaptive threshold based approach considering
the dynamic nature of traffic flow is very effective is detection of attacks
such as DoS, SPIT, fraud, etc. However, most of these techniques suffer
from setting a suitable threshold to distinguish between the legitimate and
anomalous traffic. This makes good performance of these threshold based
solutions in the real world questionable by increasing the possibility of high
false negative rate. Moreover, threshold based approach does not always
work very well since a careful hacker can evade this security measure by
crafting an attack that keeps the CPU usage below the threshold, while
still interfering with the genuine network traffic.
Signature/rule based technique is another popular approach adopted
by researchers for intrusion detection. This technique provides the oppor-
tunity to easily detect different types of attacks. However, handling of
intrusion/anomalous detection problem in the context of SIP with a table-
drive approach (rule/signature database) is destined to run up against the
combinatorial explosion, as there are endless ways of forming a malformed
or malicious message. Again, the stochastic nature of arrival rate of call
requests that varies with time cannot be easily modeled by a deterministic
process with a time-varying rate and thus developing an efficient attack
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signature remains a challenge. Formal techniques, such as state machines
based on the network protocols and the interaction among them are also
utilized for intrusion detection. This approaches, however, are memory in-
tensive as many state machines are required for protection against various
attacks.
Machine learning and data mining techniques seem promising for traf-
fic analysis and network intrusion detection, particularly, in the detection
and prevention of fradulant traffic and SPIT calls. However, effective de-
ployment of machine learning and data mining based intrusion detection
depends on a deep semantic insight into a system’s capabilities and limi-
tations.
Though a number of security control systems for the attack detection
and protection of SIP based services are available in recent literature, lack
of sufficient dataset (e.g., VoIP traffic) affects the proper performance test-
ing of these systems and also limits the possibility of comparing the results
of different security control systems.
These considerations mandate two different, yet related, lines of research
and development. First of all, filtering architectures able to analyze the
syntax of protocols and correlate it with the potential semantic of the ser-
vice are needed to control the traffic. These tools will be initially developed
based on heuristics considerations, i.e., analysis modules will be developed
based on rule-of-thumb considerations on users’ and protocols’ behavior,
since presently there is no theoretical framework that can drive their de-
velopment. Second, synthetic models for generating traffic are needed to
match real world traffic characteristics, to build a solid theoretical insight
on the system behavior, and finally to cross-check and tune the heuristics
analysis tools.
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Building a SIP Analysis
Methodologies
3.1 Formal Representation of VoIP Security Domain
The pre-requisite of designing any security measure for VoIP system is
to obtain some knowledge about the security challenges in the VoIP do-
main. A single taxonomy is not likely to be definitive, thus, various cat-
egorizations of potential attacks against VoIP services are defined by re-
searchers using several different viewpoints and mapping the vulnerability
space along several axis. In order to enable the domain experts to share,
utilize and exchange this knowledge, it is necessary to have these attack
taxonomies represented in some formal way followed by specific security
recommendations and guidelines for protecting the underlying infrastruc-
ture from these attacks.
Ontologies [53,73] are widely used in different fields (e.g., artificial intel-
ligence, the Semantic Web, systems engineering, software engineering, etc)
to formally represent knowledge as a set of concepts within a domain, using
a shared vocabulary to denote the types, properties and inter-relationships
of those concepts. Ontological approach is popular for knowledge represen-
tation due to its numerous advantages over taxonomies and other classi-
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fication schemes. Through an ontology a common information structures
of a domain can be formed, knowledge can be reused, assumptions within
a domain can be made, and various semantic relationship among different
concept of the domain can be explored.
In recent years, ontologies seem extremely promising in knowledge rep-
resentation also in the field of information and communication security
[14, 54, 82, 96, 146, 196]. These ontologies can be also employed in a real
environment for intrusion detection, security testing and vulnerabilities
identification purpose [12,114,147,189,190]. Specially, the use of an ontol-
ogy seems promising in intrusion detection in distributed environments [2]
where the system and its constituent components should have a common
mechanism to share the collected knowledge about security attacks and
their countermeasures.
[44, 67] present that ontology-based security policies can be also ap-
plied in a real VoIP environment. Authors of [44] demonstrate that the
proposed ontology, combined with a set of attack identification criteria, as
its underlying axioms and rules, could support intrusion detection process
of the SIP based VoIP services.
Inspired by above research, we introduce an ontology named “VoIP-
Onto”, a common vocabulary to exchange security related information of
the VoIP domain. “VoIP-Onto” is an attempt to define a comprehensive
taxonomy of potential attacks in a formal way by combining different tax-
onomies proposed in related literature. It models the categorizations of
potential attacks, threats and vulnerabilities against VoIP services, coun-
termeasures and their relations. The ontology can be used as a general
vocabulary, road map, and extensible dictionary of the domain of informa-
tion security. Chapter 4 describes the content of the “VoIP-Onto” as well
as its usages, potential for extension, technical implementation and tools
for working with it.
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3.2 SIP Message Filtering Methodology
The first step of our SIP analysis and anomaly detection process is the
control of single messages to determine if they are “good” or “bad” mes-
sages so that the latter can be discarded, thus avoiding the possibility that
they can cause the execution of harmful procedures. The distinction be-
tween “good” and “bad” SIP messages is a somewhat fuzzy concept, since
there are many different ways for a message to be “bad”. Fig. 3.1 shows
a simple classification tree to clear the terminology of “good” and “bad”
SIP messages that we have used in this thesis.
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Figure 3.1: Simple binary classification of SIP messages highlighting the terminology used
in the thesis
A “good” message is simply a valid SIP message that can be correctly
interpreted by its recipient. This means the message is syntactically cor-
rect, semantically meaningful, and comes at the right time to trigger a
correct and useful application decision. From a theoretical point of view,
“bad” messages are the complement of the set of “good” messages, but
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this will not help much in the classification process. We define the set of
“bad” messages as the union of “malformed”, “crooked”, and “malicious”
messages. “Malformed” messages are those that simply are syntactically
wrong. “Crooked” messages are those that, while syntactically correct,
have no meaning, cannot be interpreted, are ambiguous, or lead to a dead-
lock, etc. Finally, “malicious” messages, are those that are syntactically
correct and semantically meaningful, but will harm the system: normally
these are forged on purpose, but they can also be the outcome of mal-
functioning devices, badly implemented instances of the protocol or, more
likely, of its extensions.
Because of the different nature of the structure, contents and timing
of these “bad” messages, their classification is best carried out by spe-
cialized detectors: a multistage classifier. Though our proposed ontology
“VoIP-Onto” can be employed in a real environment for testing or intrusion
detection purposes, it is a tough job to define a comprehensive set of rules
in order to detect the diverse and endless form of “bad” messages. Con-
sidering this, we limit the scope of our proposed ontology only for sharing
domain knowledge about the taxonomy of VoIP attacks and guidelines of
countermeasures in the hope that it will serve as a starting point for the
new researchers to understand security risks in the VoIP domain.
The multistage architecture allows better separation of the intrinsically
different tasks and offers the possibility of pipelined parallelism on separate
hardware if message traffic volumes warrant or require classification rates
that cannot be achieved by a single processor. Fig. 3.2 shows the logical
architecture of the SIP traffic analysis & filtering system. The proposed
architecture is a lightweight application and can be installed on the same
machine of the agent, or, if performance requires it, as a kind of firewall in
front of it.
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Figure 3.2: System Architecture for SIP message classification
3.2.1 Lexical Analyzer
The first stage filtering is performed by the lexical analyzer which inves-
tigates each SIP message to determine if they are part of the language
generated by the formal grammar which specifies the SIP protocol [156].
This straightforward tool follows a deterministic and efficient process to
identify and discard all mistakes and malformations that violate the gram-
mar.
3.2.2 Support Vector Machine for Classification
SIP messages that have passed the lexical analyzer filter may still be “bad”
as they can be semantically meaningless or can carry harmful content.
Detection of these “bad” messages is a more complex task and requires a
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more delicate handling, as it is not a sharp decision whether a message is
semantically meaningful or not. Any hope of tackling this problem with
an algorithmic or table-drive approach is destined to run up against the
combinatorial explosion of the cases that need to be considered, as there are
endless ways of forming a “crooked” or “malicious” message. We need to
consider that there are 14 request message types, 6 response message kinds
(discussed in sub-section 1.2.3), there are no upper limits on some values
such as the length of headers, that some fields are mandatory while other
are optional and finally there are multiple ways of structuring a correct
SIP message. This results in the practical impossibility of systematically
examining all possible cases of corruption casual or voluntary of a message.
For these reasons, we turned our attention to machine-learning tech-
niques in which an automaton can “trained” by being shown a sufficiently
rich set of “good”/“bad” examples. After the automaton has been ade-
quately trained (for instance, until the classification error percentage falls
below a given threshold), it can be used to classify messages that were
never seen before. An added bonus of this approach is in its flexibility to fit
new kinds of “bad” messages that might become common at a later time,
perhaps as a new breed of malicious messages is introduced when some
weakness of the protocol is uncovered. The adaptation to the changed
operating scenario can be obtained simply by retraining the machine au-
tomaton while including the new messages, duly identified as bad.
Various approaches to supervised machine learning have been proposed.
Recently the so called Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) and the Support
Vector Machines (SVM) have received much attention [105,125] since they
have performed quite well in a variety of problem contexts. For our second
and third stage filter, we have selected to use a SVM for the reasons that
will be discussed below. SVMs have been introduced by Vapnik in [192] and
have been successfully applied to many fields such as Bio-informatics, Nat-
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ural Language Processing, Handwritten Character Recognition and many
others. Unlike Artificial Neural Networks, SVMs do not have the prob-
lem of getting stuck in a local minimum while searching for an optimal
configuration of its operating parameters (see for example [23, 25, 170]).
In addition, SVMs are scalable since the computational complexity does
not depend on the dimensionality of the input space. Finally, SVMs op-
timization by training (or re-training) is quite fast, which can represent
an important point if online intrusion (re)configuration is of paramount
importance.
3.2.3 Support Vector Machine Basics
The basic idea of SVM classification is to interpret the d-dimensional fea-
ture vectors derived from SIP messages as points in an d-dimensional space.
Some of these points correspond to “good” messages (label them as −1)
and the others correspond to “bad” messages (label them as +1). The
classification problem can be seen as finding an hyper plane that separates
the space in two sub-spaces: one containing all the −1 points, the other
all the +1 points. If the set of points is linearly separable into two classes,
there are infinite planes that will work. However, there is only one “best”
hyper plane that maximizes the distance between it and the nearest data
points of each class. Unfortunately, it is often the case that no such hyper
plane exists (the set of points is not linearly separable) and hence some
points would be misclassified, as they would lay on the “wrong” side of the
best hyper plane. However, while not linearly separable, the points could
be separable if some other, more complex, surface were used instead of
the (simple) hyper plane. Informally, the SVM computation does this by
projecting all points into a higher-dimensional space and in that space the
complex separating surface becomes a hyper plane, thus linearly separating
the set of projected points.
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More precisely, given a set of n SIP messages, let ~xi be the i-th mes-
sage which is transferred into a d dimensional feature vector and let yi ∈
{−1,+1} be and indicator function where −1 indicates that the i-th mes-
sage belongs to the class of “good” message class while +1 indicates that
the i-th message is in the “bad” message class. The equation of the hyper-
plane separating the training set
{
(xi, yi) |xi ∈ <d, yi ∈ {−1, 1}
}i=1
n
can be
defined as:
~w · ~x+ b = 0 (3.1)
where ~w is the vector normal to the hyperplane and b‖~w‖ is the perpendicular
distance from the hyperplane to the origin.
For the linearly separable data, SVM finds the optimum separating hy-
perplane with the largest margin (Fig. 3.3) by solving the Quadratic Pro-
gramming (QP) optimization problem described by eq. (3.2).
min
‖~w‖
2
2
 , subject to yi (~w · ~xi + b) ≥ 1 , ∀i (3.2)
If the set of points is not linearly separable, then instead of trying to fit a
non-linear model, the set of points can be mapped to a higher-dimensional
space by a non-linear mapping function φ, ~x→ φ(~x) so that the points be-
come linearly separable in this higher dimensional space. The classification
function in dual space becomes:
h (x) = sgn (φ (~w) · φ (~x) + b) (3.3)
= sgn
i=1∑
n
αiyiφ (~xi) · φ (~x) + b
 (3.4)
In the quadratic optimization problem for non-linearly separable data SVM,
the training vectors appear only in the form of dot products, (φ (~xi) , φ (~xj))
which imply that computationally expensive dot product calculation is
needed. However, by using the so called “kernel functions” one can apply
a “kernel trick” that avoids the expensive dot products. Kernel functions
that have been favored in the recent literature include:
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Figure 3.3: Linear Support Vector Machine: optimum separation hyperplane
• Linear kernels: k (~xi, ~x) = ~xi · ~x;
• Polynomial kernels of degree d: k (~xi, ~x) = (~xi · ~x)d;
• Radial Basis Functions (RBF) kernels:
k (~xi, ~x) = exp
(−||~xi − ~x||2/2σ2).
Thus, the classification function of eq. (3.3) becomes:
h (x) = sgn
i=1∑
n
αiyik (~xi · ~x) + b
 (3.5)
Fig. 3.4 represents the polynomial projection of non-linear data into high-
dimentional feature space where they are linearly separable.
3.2.4 SIP Traffic Analysis and modeling
While the identification of syntactically incorrect SIP messages is straight-
forward (e.g., either a messages belongs to the language defined by the
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Figure 3.4: Non-linear SVM: polynomial mapping
protocol [156] or it does not), detection of semantically meaningless and
harmful content requires the classifier to be integrated and trained with the
information about the legitimate system and users behavior. It requires to
correlate different messages to gain a thorough knowledge about the sys-
tem behavior. In fact, without a deep knowledge of the normal behavior of
the network and users only major service failures would be detectable, and
even these would still require huge amount of time for their root cause iden-
tification. Even worse, silent problems (e.g., telemarketers sending unso-
licited communications using bot machines, billing fraud, a malicious user
attempting to impersonate another user during a call, etc) not leading to
an immediate service meltdown would be completely untraceable reducing
the users’ confidence and satisfaction in the overall service. For instance,
detection of unsolicited calls by checking the single message without having
any prior knowledge about the normal behavior of the system and users is
not possible. It requires information about the social interaction pattern
of both the caller and the receiver, and also the trust relationship between
them to suspect a call as spam before attending. In VoIP domain, the
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legitimate VoIP callers usually have specific calling patterns toward their
friends and family members, while, a telemarketer or spam caller usually
collects callees identities by crawling the web or reading telephony direc-
tories and normally results in a non-connected social network. The social
interaction patterns of these callers are different from those of legitimate
callers. This difference in social behavior of normal and spam callers reveals
interesting information useful for identifying spam callers.
To this end, we have focused on an in-depth analysis of the network
to learn the normal behavior of the system. We use the Social Network
Analysis techniques in the stream of SIP messages to exploit different levels
of behavioral patterns of users. Details about the social behavior analysis
and modeling is presented in chapter 7.
3.2.5 SVM Classifiers
The second and third stages of our multistage classifier are meant to de-
tect those “crooked” and “malicious” messages. Here, two separate SVM
classifiers are used due to differences in nature and detection process of
“crooked” and “malicious” messages. Furthermore, multistage SVMs have
been considered more effective than single stage SVM in other classification
tasks (see for example [115] [99]).
The SVM classifiers are trained with the normal behavior of the sys-
tem and users observed from traffic analysis. The machines, thus trained,
are capable of identifying semantically meaningless and malicious content
and users. Details about the configuration of the SVM classifiers and the
detection accuracy is described in chapter 6 and 7.
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Chapter 4
Ontology of VoIP Security Domain
As mentioned in section 3.1, ontologies1 are suitable for formalization of
information about VoIP threats and also modeling security control sys-
tems. Ontologies rely on well-defined and semantically powerful artificial
intelligence concepts such as description logics and provide explicit formal
specifications of the terms in domains and relations among them [73], and
an extremely promising paradigm in computer security field.
Though a small body of research has been dedicated to analyze the use
of ontology in modeling network and computer attacks, very few attempts
are found [66, 67] focusing on the formation of ontology of VoIP domain.
[66] introduces a formalization which can be used for the identification of
illegitimate behavior of SIP-based VoIP services. The authors only consider
dos (denial of service) attacks rather than providing a general structure of
possible attacks against VoIP system and their detection mechanisms.
To counteract this lack, we define an ontology named “VoIP-Onto”
which can be considered as a conceptual model of VoIP threat domain
considering the semantic relationship among security threats, attacks and
system environment. Defining such an ontology is challenging especially
when syntax and semantics are not sufficient to describe legitimate and
anomalous behavior in VoIP networks. The following sections describe the
1Ontology, http://semanticweb.org/wiki/Ontology
67
CHAPTER 4. ONTOLOGY OF VOIP SECURITY DOMAIN
content and scope of the “VoIP-Onto” as well as its usages in VoIP security.
4.1 “VoIP-Onto”:An ontology of VoIP domain
“VoIP-Onto” is an ontology of VoIP domain with an emphasis on the
security perspective.
4.1.1 Domain and Scope of “VoIP-Onto”
The domain of “VoIP-Onto” includes the definition of both the legitimate
and anomalous behavior of VoIP systems. It focuses on defining a compre-
hensive VoIP attack taxonomy including the possible ways to detect the
occurrence of those attacks in VoIP systems.
The scope of this ontology is not only limited to sharing and inferring
security relation information of VoIP domain but also can be extended for
security testing, vulnerabilities identification and also anomaly/intrusion
detection purposes.
4.2 Structure of “VoIP-Onto”
“VoIP-Onto” presents a structured way to view attacks against VoIP sys-
tems by subsuming a strong taxonomy of attacks. In constructing the
ontology “VoIP-Onto”, we consider the VoIP threat taxonomy described
in 2.1 where the threats against VoIP are divided into four categories:
(i) interruption of service threats, (ii) social threats, (iii) interception and
modification of traffic threats, and (iv) abuse of service threats. Fig. 4.1
shows the taxonomy of attacks that is followed in “VoIP-Onto”. Another
focus of this ontology is to include all the important information (target,
source, mode, vulnerability, affected security criteria, etc) about the at-
tacks and to put emphasis defining important features for detecting these
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Figure 4.1: Taxonomy of attacks against VoIP domain subsumed by “VoIP-Onto”
attacks.
4.2.1 Concepts and Roles in “VoIP-Onto”
In “VoIP-Onto”, attacks against VoIP domain and various information
about attacks (e.g., source, target, vulnerabilities, motivation, affected se-
curity criteria, etc) are considered the concepts, and the semantic rela-
tion between these concepts are the roles that are defined in the ontology.
Fig. 4.2 shows the Entity-Relationship (ER) diagram of VoIP threat model
where the semantic relation between the concepts are defined. This ER
diagram can be considered as the high-level view of the proposed ontology.
The threat model in Fig. 4.2 defines the legitimate behavior in the system
as Legitimate traffic while any deviation from legal behavior is identified as
Anomalous Traffic. Attacks against VoIP systems are the main source of
anomalous behavior though abnormal traffic can also be transmitted in the
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Figure 4.2: Entitiy-Relation diagram of VoIP domain
network due to implementation flaws or misconfiguration of the system. In
order to determine the general structure of possible attacks against VoIP
system, we consider several different attributes of attacks such as target,
location, exploited vulnerabilities, etc and also reveal the semantic rela-
tion between these attributes of attacks. “VoIP-Onto” uses well known
terms of VoIP systems as concepts and to define axioms. The domain
of “VoIP-Onto” mainly includes the concept of VoIP Traffic which indi-
cates the overall traffic of a VoIP system. The class/concept VoIP Traffic
stream can be considered as the union of Legitimate Traffic and Anoma-
lous Traffic.
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• Legitimate Traffic–The concept Legitimate Traffic indicates the class
of traffic that represents the normal legitimate flow of the newtork.
• Anomalous Traffic–The concept Anomalous Traffic refers to com-
plement of the class of Legitimate Traffic. This class contains traffic
that is different from the legitimate normal flow of the network. Traf-
fic stream of this class may be caused by various VoIP attacks or
abnormal situation. So the concept Anomalous Traffic can be defined
as the union of VoIP Attack Traffic and Abnormal Traffic.
The concept VoIP Attack Traffic indicates the anomalous behavior of the
system due to attacks against VoIP system. Significant information about
VoIP attacks and rules of detection and prevention them are used to define
the concept of VoIP Attack Traffic. VoIP Attack Info is the concept/class
that is used to represent important attributes of VoIP attacks. “VoIP-
Onto” is modeled considering the network administrator’s view point and
thus special attention is given to information about attacks such as effect
of the attacks, affected security criteria, and rules for detecting attacks.
Attributes that are necessary to model VoIP attacks are described below:
• Attack Motive:This attribute represents the motivation of attackers
for launching an attack. Usually, the underlying motives of attackers
to attack VoIP application is to degrade the service, disturb users with
transmission of unsolicited messages, to steal confidential and private
information, to be benefited financially, etc.
• Attack Impact/Effect:This attribute indicates the after-effect of
the attacks. For example, attacks of the group interruption of service
threats usually they try to degrade/stop the service quality by bringing
it down.
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• Exploited Vulnerability:There exists a close relation between threat
and vulnerability. Threats can be considered as the potential viola-
tions of security while vulnerability is defined as a flaw or weakness
in a system’s design, implementation, or operation and management
that could be exploited to violate the system’s security policy. For a
threat to be effective, an associated vulnerability must exist that ulti-
mately can be exploited. If the vulnerability does not exist or it is not
possible to be exploited, the threat is categorized as minimal. So we
consider information about vulnerability as an important attribute of
VoIP attacks and consider the relationship between vulnerability and
threats in the ontology. According to [101], attacks can be occurred
exploiting the following vulnerabilities in VoIP system:
– Flaws/Weakness in Protocol–This concept/category describes
vulnerabilities which are caused due to flaws or weakness in pro-
tocol design.
– Flaws in Network Desing & Implementation–Different flaws
in network design and implementation is considered in this group.
– Poor or Misconfiguration of System–Configuration errors of
the services is considered in this group.
• Attack Source:This attribute informs about the number of the at-
tackers. Attacks can be occurred by single attacker or there can be
distributed sources to perform attacks. In the ontology, both single
and distributed source of attacks are considered.
• Attack Target:This attribute reveals the target of attacks. Attacks
can affect end users or servers.
• Affected Security Components:This attribute reflects the affected
security criteria by the attacks. We consider widely used security
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benchmark which is CIA (confidentiality, integrity and availability).
• Attack Mode:This attributes indicates the mode of operation of at-
tackers. Active mode indicates that attacks are executed directly,
while Passive mode refers to inactive mode of operation.
• Attack Prevention Mechanism:This attribute refers to the most
effective mechanisms adopted by the researchers to detect and prevent
a VoIP attack.
• Features for attack detection:This attribute mentions few signifi-
cant features for detection of an attack.
Fig. 4.3 shows the semantic relation of VoIP attack information in “VoIP-
Onto”.
4.3 Used Tool for “VoIP-Onto” Implementation
“VoIP-Onto” is implemented using Prote´ge´2, an open source semantic ed-
itor for ontology development. Particularly, The Prote´ge´-OWL editor3, an
extension of Prote´ge´ that supports the Web Ontology Language (OWL)
which is a standard ontology languages endorsed by the World Wide Web
Consortium (W3C)4, is used here. For reasoning the ontology, Pellet5, a
semantic reasoners, is used.
4.4 Usage of “VoIP-Onto”
This section demonstrates possible usages of proposed ontology “VoIP-
Onto”. This ontology is helpful for the network administrator in identifying
2Prote´ge´, http://protege.stanford.edu/
3Prote´ge´-OWL editor, http://protege.stanford.edu/overview/protege-owl.html
4World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), http://www.w3.org//
5Pellet, http://protege.stanford.edu/
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Figure 4.3: Attributes of attacks for defining VoIP attack domain.
the general pattern of vulnerabilities and attacks of VoIP systems. As a
result it can be extended and employed in a real environment for network
security testing or intrusion-detection purposes.
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4.4.1 Sharing of knowledge
“VoIP-Onto” consisting of a vocabulary used to describe security threats
of VoIP domain, an explicit specification of the intended meaning of the
vocabulary and also a specific taxonomy clarifying how concepts can be
used for capturing additional knowledge about the domain. Knowledge
about VoIP specific attacks can be retrieved from the ontology by inferring
and querying. Examples of query and reasoning the ontology for retrieving
information about attacks are shows below.
• Query 1:Find an example of Interception and Modification
attack
Response 1:Man in the Middle Attack
• Query 2:Find Two possible features for detecting INVITE
Flooding attacks
Response 2:(i)Check Message syntax, (ii) Check number of
INVITE Requests
4.4.2 Ontology for Designing Control Systems
Use of “VoIP-Onto” can be extended by incorporating this ontology in
security control systems such as intrusion detection systems. This can be
done by considering the ontology as a rule database to support the intrusion
detection process of the VoIP services. In this context, the attack iden-
tification criteria defined in “VoIP-Onto” is considered as the underlying
axioms and rules of the rule based-intrusion detection systems.
The advantage of using the ontology as a rule database for rule based-
intrusion detection is that before deployment it is possible to formally verify
the consistency of the rules and axioms with the help of a semantic rea-
soner. This formal verification (e.g., to check the consistency, satisfiability
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Figure 4.4: Query 1:Find an attack that belong to the group of Interception and Modifi-
cation attack
and correctness) of rule database before system implementation is very
important. It avoids the risk of deploying ineffective intrusion detection
systems consist of models with inconsistent assumptions. Fig. 4.6 shows
the model of anomaly detection system before reasoning. It is noticed that
the attacks are not organized according to their groups. While, Fig. 4.7
shows the same model after consistency and satisfiability checking after
reasoning with semantic reasoner Pallet [138]. It shows that the model
is consistence and the concepts (e.g., attacks) are organized according to
their groups.
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Figure 4.5: Query 2: Find Two possible features for detecting INVITE Flooding Denial
of Service attacks
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Figure 4.6: VoIP-ONTO : Taxonomy before reasoning
Figure 4.7: VoIP-ONTO : Taxonomy after reasoning
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Chapter 5
Traffic Generation, Collection and
Anonymization
In recent years researchers have designed and implemented various security
testing tools, classifiers and control systems for the analysis and protection
of SIP based services. To perform the analysis of SIP services and to test
the efficiency of these classifiers and control systems, a large number of
SIP trace is required. Unfortunately, to obtain real-world SIP traces of
attack incidents or even normal traffic is difficult as VoIP providers are
not willing to distribute their data due to user privacy agreements. No
VoIP data corpus is publicly available such as repositories1 that maintain
data sets as a service to the machine learning and data mining community.
Lack of a publicly available dataset containing VoIP traces also hinders the
possibility of comparing the results of different security control systems.
In this work, the analysis of the SIP based VoIP service and testing
of our filtering system are performed by collected SIP traces from our
institution. The system is up and running since May 2011. Since then,
1UC Irvine Machine Learning Repository, http://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/,
Datasets for Data Mining,
available at: http://www.inf.ed.ac.uk/teaching/courses/dme/html/datasets0405.html,
DARPA Intrusion Detection Data Sets,
http://www.ll.mit.edu/mission/communications/cyber/CSTcorpora/ideval/data/
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more than 242 million SIP messages have been analyzed.
5.1 Traffic Collection & Anonymization
To collect real SIP traffic, we have established an agreement with our
institution2 that allows the collection of SIP traces by mirroring the port
in front of the SIP Proxy server. The mirror port monitors and captures
all the SIP messages (associated with the incoming and outgoing calls)
that pass the SIP servers. Before storing the captured SIP traces into
the local storage, SIP messages are anonymized to hide all the sensitive
information available in a SIP message in order to mitigate privacy and
security concerns and to comply with the legal requirements [85].
The process of capturing and anonymization of SIP traffic is performed
in pipeline fashion. The monitoring process collects SIP messages in the
server and stores in a temporary buffer in the same machine where monitor-
ing process is running. For the anonymization purpose, a script, containing
codes for anonymization, is used. It is activated by a time driven trigger.
The anonymization script, thus activated automatically after a regular in-
terval (here, 24 hours), anonymized the file (stored in the temporary buffer)
that contains the captured SIP packets for the last 24 hours. The file con-
taining anonymized SIP messages is then transferred to our local storage
for analysis and the temporary buffer is cleared to make room for new
captured packets.
5.1.1 Sensitive Information in a SIP Message
A SIP message is either a request from a client to a server or a response from
a server to a client. The “request line” specifies the type of request being
issued, while the “response line” indicates the success or failure of a request.
2SISTI office (Sistemi Informativi, Servizi e Tecnologie Informatiche), University of Trento
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Both the request and the response contain a “start-line” (request/response
line) followed by one or more headers and a message body. Example of a
SIP INVITE request message is shown in Fig. 1.2.
Sensitive information in a SIP Message refers to any kind of knowledge
about SIP user agents and servers in a SIP message that prevents the
distribution of that message due to privacy and security issue. Fig. 5.1
highlights the fields containing sensitive information in a SIP INVITE
message. Fields containing information about the service provider, ser-
Via:SIP/2.0/UDP pc33.server1.com;branch=z9hG4bK776
Max-Forwards : 70
To :  user2 <sip:user2@server2.com> 
From :  user1 <sip: user1@server1.com>;tag=19283017
Call-ID : a84b4c76e66710@pc33.server1.com
CSeq :  3121 
Contact :  sip:user1@pc33.server1.com
INVITE sip:user2@server2.com SIP/2.0
INVITE
o= user1 2890844526 IN IP4 pc33.server1.com
s = Session SDP
c = IN IP4 157.24.25.137
 t = 0 0 :  sip:user1@pc33.server1.com
m = audio 49172 RTP/AVP 0
a = rtpmap:0 PCMU/8000
I IT  sip:user2 server2.co  I /2.0
i : I / . /  . r r . ; r
ll-I  : . .
   I  I  . .
Figure 5.1: Sensivite Information in a SIP INVITE Request Message.
vice route, server, “caller” or “callee” (such as, SIP Uris, IP address) in a
SIP message are described below together with example of usage.
• Request line–The first line of a SIP request message containing in-
formation about request method and protocol version, and, address
of the “callee”.
INVITE sip:user2@server2.com SIP/2.0
• Contact–Contain a display name, a URI with URI parameters, and
81
CHAPTER 5. TRAFFIC GENERATION, COLLECTION AND ANONYMIZATION
header parameters.
Contact:< sip:alice@server3.com>
• From–Indicates the initiator of the request.
From:Caller <sip:caller@server1.com>
• To–Specifies the logical recipient of the request.
To:receiver <sip:user2@server2.edu>
• Via–Indicates the path taken by the request and also should be fol-
lowed in routing responses.
Via:SIP/2.0/UDP server1.com:5060;branch=z9hG4bK87asdks7
• Authorization–Contains authentication credentials of a user agent.
Authorization:Digest username=‘‘user1’’,realm=‘‘server1.com’’
• Call-Info–Provides additional information about the caller or callee.
Call-Info:<http://wwww.example.com/user1/photo>
• In-Reply-To–Enumerates the Call-IDs that a call references or re-
turns.
In-Reply-To:70710@server1.com
• Organization–Conveys the name of the organization to which the
SIP element belongs. Organization:organization name
• Proxy-Authenticate–Contains an authentication challenge.
Proxy-Authenticate:Digest realm=‘server1.com’’,
domain=‘sip:ss1.carrier.com’’,algorithm=MD5
• Proxy-Authorization–Contains client’s identity (to proxy) that re-
quires authentication.
Proxy-Authorization:Digest username=‘‘user1’’,
realm=‘‘server1.com’’
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• Reply-To–Contains a logical return URI that may be different from
the From header field.
Reply-To:Bob<sip:user3@server1.com>
• Route–Contains list of proxies used to force routing for a request.
Route:<sip:server1.com; lr>
5.1.2 Anonymization of SIP messages
A script performs the anonymization of SIP messages. This script takes
individual SIP message as an input and anonymizes all the sensitive infor-
mation available. Particularly, it hides all the SIP URIs and IP addresses
so that identity of the “caller” and “callee” is not disclosed.
The anonymization is performed using a cryptographic hash function
which is one of the most popular methods of anonymizing data. We have
sip:alice@exmple.com
MD5 Hash 
Function
6969 1c7b dcc3 ce6d 
5d8a 1361 f22d 04ac
Input Hash Value
sip:a@exmple.com
MD5 Hash 
Function
23be cb09 3bdd d87e
817e dfa1 7962 f9e8
sip:alice@exmple.com
MD5 Hash 
Function
6969 1c7b dcc3 ce6d 
5d8a 1361 f22d 04ac
sip:ab@exmple.com
MD5 Hash 
Function
877e 569d b075 2088
4c36 df51 8337 5780
Figure 5.2: Example of a data anonymization using hash table.
used the MD5 message-digest algorithm [153] which has been utilized in
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a wide variety of cryptographic applications, and also for verifying data
integrity. MD5 hash function produces a 128-bit (16-byte) hash value,
typically expressed in the text format as a 32 digit hexadecimal number.
In the anonymization process, each occurrence of a SIP URI and a IP
address is hashed. An example of the hashing process of SIP URIs is shown
in Fig. 5.2.
5.2 “SIP-Msg-Gen” - Synthetic SIP Messages Gen-
erator
As could be expected on a closed network such as ours, there were no
“bad” messages that were maliciously sent with the intention of creating
disruptions of service or of harming the network3. To counteract the lack of
“bad” traces in our collected sample, we focus on an alternative approach
which is to synthetically generate “bad” traces and randomly inject them
into the stream of real “good” VoIP traces.
To mitigate the lack of syntax and semantic errors in our collected sam-
ple, we developed “SIP-Msg-Gen”4, a synthetic SIP message generator,
capable of generating both “good” and “bad” SIP messages. “SIP-Msg-
Gen” is available under GPL license terms. It is a stateful and context
aware simulator consists of a syntax fuzzer sepcifying the syntax to gen-
erate a well-formed SIP message and rules to manipulate it, and a set of
state transaction rules to model the transitions of messages in the system.
State transition rules are defined based on the test scenarios, where a sce-
nario represents a high level goal. Test scenarios are: (i) a basic call flow
between two user agents, (ii) a basic call flow between two user agents with
3This condition is however about to change as our institution is going to be directly connected with
public VoIP networks. This work is an attempt to prepare ourselves for protecting the network from
malicious users in such public environment.
4“SIP-Msg-Gen”, available at: http://disi.unitn.it/~ferdous/SIP-Msg-Gen.html
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fuzzed SIP messages, (iii) a SIP user agent is under INVITE flooding at-
tack, and (iv) a SIP user agent is under REGISTER flooding attack. The
generation of SIP messages begins with the automatic generation of N SIP
URIs. Only identifiers are generated, not instances of a user entity, so that
configuration of users characteristics is not required.
5.2.1 Syntax Fuzzer
SIP is a text-based protocol, the information exchanged within the proto-
col is encoded as strings of characters. Syntax of the SIP messages are de-
fined by a context-free grammar specified in Augmented Backus-Naur Form
(ABNF) [35], a metalanguage based on Backus-Naur Form (BNF). Context
free grammars such as ABNF are effective in generating test data [120].
Our simulator is able to flexibly generate thousands of well-formed SIP
messages following the ABNF syntax of SIP messages defined in the IETF
standard.
Fuzzing of SIP Messages
A fuzzed SIP message can be either a valid “torture” message to stress
the SIP server or an invalid message that does not comply with the syntax
or the semantic of SIP protocol specification. In the context of the SIP
protocol, there are endless ways to fuzz a SIP message. This can be done
either by crafting an well-formed SIP message or generating a bad SIP
messages from the scratch by defining a comprehensive grammar for fuzzed
SIP messages. We follow the first option where the idea is to tamper a well-
formed SIP message by injecting invalid, unexpected, or random data.
Generation of a SIP message with syntax and semantic error is inspired
by “SIP torture test” as defined in RFC 4475 [177] and PROTOS test
suite [201]. The “malicious” messages are generated following the attack
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Table 5.1: Types of fuzzed SIP messages
Malformed Messages
Error in Request line
Syntax error in one/multiple mandatory header field
Syntax error in one/multiple optional header field
Syntax Error in body of a message
Crooked Messages
Missing mandatory fields
Duplicate entry for unique fields
Unknown/Invalid Protocol version
Presence of garbage string/invalid character in message
Hierarchical disorder of message structure
Unknown scheme for header fields and message body
Unknown Method Name and Response status
Tortured Messages
Overlarge Message Body
Extra white spaces between colons, semicolons, header field values
Use of extra colons, semicolons in header fields
Use of Escaped characters in messages
Presence of empty optional header fields and parameters
Line folding all over the message
scenarios described in [101, 131, 184]. Table 5.1 shows the scenarios that
the simulator considers to fuzz a SIP messages.
5.2.2 Test Case:Generation of a basic call
This test case follows a very basic SIP call flow between two user agents
Fig. 5.3 shows the state transition diagram followed by “SIP-Msg-Gen” to
generate SIP messages involved in a call flow (illustrated in subsection
1.2.5 in Fig. 1.3) between two user agents. The model starts at the INIT
state, when a user agent A (caller) sends an INVITE message indicationg
that A wish to communicate/talk with othe user agent B (callee). Here,
A and B are randomly selected two SIP URIs from the pre-defined user
of SIP URIs by the simulator. At this stage, “SIP-Msg-Gen” generates a
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Figure 5.3: State transition diagram of a basic call flow between two SIP user agents.
well-formed SIP INVITE message and transits to the next state INVITE
Msg Received. Upon receiving the INVITE message the next state is a
response message (TRYING 100) sent by the proxy server to UAC A to
acknowledge that the INVITE is being processed. The UAC B sends a
response (Ringing 180) when his telephone begins to ring. The state of the
call establishment is performed by UACB by responding (OK 200 message)
to the invitation and a connection is established. Then media streams are
exchanged directly between UAC A (caller) and UAC B (callee). The
session is ended by an BYE request message to the server from any UAC
(A or B) and a repliy with an OK 200 message from other UAC.
5.2.3 Test Case:Presence of fuzzed SIP message in a call flow
Fig. 5.4 shows the state transition diagram followed by “SIP-Msg-Gen” to
generate a basic call flow between two user agents where the SIP messages
involved in the dialog can be fuzzed. At the INIT state, the predicate
checks the value of the boolean variable Fuzz Flag. Fuzz Flag assigned as
true refers to a transition to state Fuzzed INVITE Msg where a fuzzy SIP
INVITE message is generated by the simulator. On the other hand, Fuzz
Flag assigned as false indicates the transition to state INVITE Msg where
an well-formed SIP INVITE message is generated. This above process is
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Figure 5.4: State transition diagram of a basic call between two SIP user agents using
fuzzed SIP messages.
followed through all the states involved in call establishment and termina-
tion. The value (e.g., true and false) of the Fuzz Flag is selected randomly
in every state.
5.2.4 Test Case:SIP INVITE flooding attack scenario
Fig. 5.5 shows the state transition diagram for generating the INVITE re-
quest flooding attacks. This model is inspired by the state transition model
defined in [167]. The model starts at the INIT state with the generation of
a SIP message. At this state, the predicate checks the message type of the
received message. On receiving the first INVITE request, the state machine
makes a transition from the INIT state to the intermediate state INVITE
Msg Received. During this transition, a counter packet counter is started
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Figure 5.5: State transition diagram of SIP INVITE flooding attack.
to count the received INVITE messages for the same destination within a
certain amount of time (T1). Timer T1 sets the time window, under which
N received INVITE requests are considered as normal. To immitate the
flooding attack scenario “SIP-Msg-Gen” generates (N*2) INVITE request
during time window T1.
5.3 VoIPTG - VoIP Traffic Generator
In this thesis, we also concentrate on detecting the malicious intruders by
training a classifier with the knowledge about the social behavioral pattern
of legitimate VoIP users. For the purpose of evaluating the performance
of the classifier, a huge amount of high level VoIP traffic (e.g., call detail
records) containing malicious content is required. Our collected SIP traces
do not contain any information about malicious users due to the lack of
“bad” messages that were maliciously sent with the intention of harming
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the network. To counteract this limitation, we have developed “VoIPTG”
(VoIP Traffic Generator)5, a flexible and generic traffic simulator, which is
capable to generate traffic following various possible models of SIP based
VoIP system with special attention to characterize the more sophisticated
user behavior in the system. “VoIPTG” is available under GPL license
terms. One added bonus of the current version of “VoIPTG” is that it is
capable to generate a combination of “good” and “bad” traffic instead of
only “good” or only “bad”.
5.3.1 State-of-the-art of Synthetic traffic Generation
Designing models for generating synthetic traffic of SIP based VoIP system
is not trivial as SIP is one of the most complex and hard to debug IETF
standard ever. Its extensibility, the fact that it must maintain an often
complex status of the session, the structure of proxy agents and servers
that define the global organization of services like telephony, conferencing,
and so forth, indicates that characteristic of traffic in SIP based VoIP
services is different from traditional fixed telephony networks. Difference in
characteristics also means different parameters to characterize the traffic,
thus, traditional traffic models such as the Erlang, Engset and Poisson
model are not sufficient to model SIP based VoIP traffic [30, 36, 37, 77].
This introduces the necessity for a new consideration on modeling the
traffic of the SIP based VoIP services.
Though many projects are focusing on developing tools and solutions for
generating synthetic telephony traffic, there is very little available in terms
of simulator for generating traces of SIP based VoIP system. Moreover,
lack of flexibility in deployment and sufficient guidance to use limit the
scope of this simulators.
5Source code and user manual of “VoIPTG” is available at - http://disi.unitn.it/~ferdous/
VoIPTG.html
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A list of VoIP security testing tools and attack simulators is found in
[206]. Authors of [48] mention a list of attack simulators to test the security
threats of VoIP applications.
“SIPp” [172] is a free open source traffic generator for the SIP protocol.
It includes a few basic user agent scenarios (UAC and UAS) to establish
and release multiple calls with the INVITE and BYE methods. It generates
traffic by repeating call flow scenarios described in custom XML. Though
it allows the definition of call flows from very simple to complex one using
XML, defining a large number of call flows to generate a huge amount of
SIP traffic is tedious and time consuming.
It is noticed that, the tools mentioned above follow simple techniques
to generate random SIP messages/calls instead of considering the complex
traffic models, hense, they are mainly used for testing the robustness of
SIP implementation. Moreover, these available tools do not identify all
the key parameters required for characterizing the SIP based VoIP traffic
and fail to capture the complex statistical properties of the VoIP traces.
More explicitly, these implementations ignore the complex user behavior
in the SIP based services which is very significant due to the unpredictable
behavior of users in the network.
Authors of [93] propose a conversational model based VoIP traffic gen-
eration algorithm, which simulates the behavior of two users in a VoIP
session. This paper considers the “on-off” pattern of VoIP traffic [49, 79]
where voice traffic can be characterized by a succession of active periods
(talkspurt or “on”) followed by inactive period (silence or “off”). According
to this behavior of speakers, this paper proposes a conversational model to
simulate two speakers conversational state change and interactive process.
A framework to annotate and customize VoIP traffic considering the
different nature of traffic and user behavior in SIP based VoIP applica-
tion is proposed in [193]. Normal traffic is generated by following a traffic
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model where the call arrival pattern follows a poisson distribution and
the call holding time follows an exponential distribution. The simula-
tor provides the opportunity to define a social model for the set of users.
Here, the social model of users follows a bimodal distribution where rep-
resents the probability that a user calls another socially connected user is
Psocial, while (1− Psocial) is the probability that a user calls another socially
not/less connected user. The simulator generates attack traffic using cur-
rently available VoIP assessment tools such as “inviteflood”, Sipscan and
“Spitter”. Though [193] and [93] focus on modeling the user behavior in
synthetic traffic generation, additional architectural decisions is required
for the stochastic simulator to generate more realistic and interactive syn-
thetic traffic. This is due to the fact that the real life scenario may be
too complex to model with simple statistical distributions. Explicitely, the
call duration and volume per user distribution of SIP based VoIP traffic
follow very complicated models. [30] shows that VoIP CHT (Call Hold-
ing Time) distribution is not exponential as traditional telephony and it
can be accurately approximated by a mix of two log-normal distributions.
Again [37] shows that call holding times follow heavy-tailed distribution
rather than exponential distribution and it proposes the generalized Pareto
distribution for modeling the call holding times. [181] shows that the call
distribution over the users in SIP based VoIP has a power-law property
which can be characterized with Zipf Distribution. This introduces the ne-
cessity of implementing a stochastic generator that is capable to model the
realistic behavior profiles for users and attackers, and, provide flexibility
and efficiency in generation of large amount of synthetic traffic of SIP based
VoIP system. Considering this situation, we concentrate on developing a
synthetic generator for generating traces of SIP based VoIP services.
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5.3.2 Traffic Models of VoIPTG
As mentioned before, analysis on VoIP traces shows the difference in the
characteristics of VoIP traces from the traditional POTS and ISDN. With
the rapid change of telephony technology from traditional PSTN to SIP
based VoIP architecture, it is expected that the ongoing transition toward
IP telephony will also change the characteristics to define the traffic [80].
Characterization of SIP based VoIP traffic with one specific model is diffi-
cult as the traces can be very different depending on the network structure,
vendors and users.
Traditional telephony traffic monitoring was mainly focused on interar-
rival times and call holding times (the time from the callee answer to the
end of the circuit tear-down) in order to properly dimension the network
and estimate revenues. In modern IP-telephony, network dimensioning is
less of a concern: capacity in IP-based systems is cheap (at least for voice-
related traffic volumes), and SIP-based signaling can support millions of
users on off-the-shelf hardware. All the three points above hints the same
direction for metrics of interest for the new telephony: a) call durations;
b) ringing times; c) volume of generated traffic per address/user over a
certain time-span; and d) multiple active calls per address/user. Many
additional metrics can be found and may be of interest, but the four above
are fundamental, thus before considering any other it is worth exploring
the importance and characteristics of these four. Metrics a) and b) can be
associated to calls without a per-user architecture. Metrics c) and d) are
instead strictly correlated to the users’ behavior. Table 5.2 presents the
list of possible distributions/patterns for the four above parameters that
current implementation of “VoIPTG” is able to follow in order to generate
SIP traffic.
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Parameter Implemented Distribution
Call Duration
Exponential Distribution,
Log Normal Distribution
Interarrival Time Exponential Distribution
Volume per Caller
Call generation with Delta rate,
Uniform(Max-Min),
Zipf Distribution
Volume per Receiver Call receive with Delta rate
Table 5.2: [
Distributions for fundamental parameters for generating synthetic VoIP Traffic]List of implemented
distributions for fundamental parameters for generating synthetic VoIP Traffic.
5.3.3 VoIPTG - Logical Architecture
With the suitable choice of models of network parameters (listed in Ta-
ble 5.2), “VoIPTG” is able to generate trace that immitates the comple
real world SIP based VoIP traffic. Fig. 5.6 reports the logical flow of call
generation in “VoIPTG”.
The generation of a trace begins with the automatic generation of Nu
users identifiers. Only identifiers are generated, not instances of a user
entity, so that configuration of users characteristics is not required. The
generation of user domain is important in this context as “VoIPTG” pays
special attention on characterizing the sophisticated behavior of users in a
network. VoIPTG maintains two user sets to indicate the caller set who
generates the call and the receiver set who receives the generated call.
These two user sets are not disjoint and the overlapping ratio between
these two user sets is configurable. This concept can be extended to the
concept of internal and external user of a VoIP service provider.
Once the users’ set is created, call generation follows a streamlined pro-
cedure: a new call is characterized by its (global) interarrival time from
the preceding one, its call duration, and finally it is assigned to one of
the users’ identifiers available as caller and one as callee. Shaded block
in Fig. 5.6 are the stochastic characterization of calls and they are inde-
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New Call
Interarrival time
call duration
Assign call to user
print CDR
generate user set
Figure 5.6: Work flow of Synthetic Traffic Generator(VoIPTG).
pendent one another and independent from the users identifiers, so that
“VoIPTG” configuration is simple and call generation is fast and efficient.
Any stochastic block can take different distributions as listed in Table 5.2.
The dashed connection between the block generating the user set and the
block assigning calls to the users indicates only sharing of the database and
not a logical flow in the generation process. “VoIPTG” is written in Java
and generates in the order of 106 calls per second on standard, off-the-shelf
hardware.
The input of “VoIPTG” is the configuration file contains the input pa-
rameters of the traffic generation and the output of the simulator is a list
of calls refers to communication between two SIP users for the purposes
of a multimedia conversation. The generated calls are represented in the
form of standard Call Details Record (CDR) which can be read by any call
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Call Info Details
Call ID Sequence number of the generated call(long number)
Start Time Start time of the call (second)
End Time End time of the call (second)
Call Duration Duration of the call (second)
Caller User from user domain (sip address)
Receiver User from user domain (sip address)
Response ”OK”
Response Code 200 (Code 200 indicates the established call)
Table 5.3: Format of a synthetic call detail record by “VoIPTG”
monitoring system where each call is identified with a Call ID. Each CDR
is also associated with detail information such as call duration, starting
time and ending time of the call, caller and receiver. The output format
of VoIPTG is found in Table 5.3 and Fig. 5.7 shows an example of output
file containing synthetic call records.
Figure 5.7: An example of output Call Detail Records of “VoIPTG”.
5.3.4 Example - Synthetic Trace Generation with “VoIPTG”
The current version of “VoIPTG” provides the flexibility of defining mul-
tiple caller sets with different call generation property. This feature can be
used to replicate the real world telephony scenario where in the stream of
“good” trace there is the existence of “bad” trace. The “good” traces are
generated by legitimate users such as , home users, commercial users, etc.
while “bad” traces are the attacks from malicious users.
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This sub-section shows an example of generation of mixed (a combina-
tion of “good” and “bad”) synthetic traces with “VoIPTG”. In this sce-
nario, we consider the user domain of a telecom provider. Its legitimate
user domain can be divided into two overlapping sets defined as Caller and
Receiver. Again, there may be some attackers outside the network of the
telecom provider, who generate spam calls (SPIT) or flooded the server
with calls to disrupt the service. These callers are gathered into two sets
defined as SPIT Attacker and DoS Attacker. Call generated by the set of
Caller, SPIT Attacker and DoS Attacker are directed to the users of the
set of Receiver. Among these, calls generated from users from Caller set
are defined as good calls. This above described user domain is presented
in Fig. 5.8.
Figure 5.8: Example of User domain for synthetic traffic generation.
Fig. 5.8 shows that to model the above scenario, three configuration
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files (named input.properties, input1.properties and input2.properties are
prepared considering the call generation patterns of three caller sets (e.g.,
Caller, SPIT Attacker and DoS Attacker).
The generation of traffic starts by creating the three caller sets and the
universal receiver set. “VoIPTG” instantiates new traffic generation phases
according to the configuration files containing call generation property for
each caller set. Finally the generated traces are combined together in a
file and thus we get the merged file which is a combination of “good” and
“bad” traffic.
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Conformance and Security Analysis
This chapter reports the conformance and security analysis of SIP mes-
sages. Part of this work is published in [56] and [57]. In this work, SIP
messages are analyzed to be classified as “good” or “bad” depending on
whether their structure and content are deemed acceptable or not. The
set of “bad” messages contains those whose syntax is incorrect and those
whose semantics can cause problems. In addition, there are messages that
per-se are syntactically and semantically correct but that collectively can
pose a threat to the system. Correspondingly, in Section 3.2, we label
messages in the three sets as malformed, crooked and malicious messages.
6.1 Filtering Methodology
Because of the different structure, contents and timing of the SIP “bad”
messages, their classification is best carried out by specialized detectors.
Briefly, in this work the message analysis is carried out by a multistage
classifier: the first part consists of a pretty straightforward lexical analyzer
that checks if the message obeyed the grammar of the SIP protocol stated
in [156]. As a by-product of the lexical analysis, a sequence of features are
extracted from the stream of messages. These features are analyzed for
the second stage in which a Support Vector Machine (SVM) [192] after a
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Figure 6.1: Architecture of the SIP message filtering system
suitable training, flags and discards those messages that were classified as
crooked and malicious.
A third phase is added to the multistage classifier to further cull bad
messages from those that survived the first two stages. This third stage is
also based on an SVM that has been trained to detect malicious messages.
The overall architecture is shown in Fig. 6.1.
The multistage architecture is maintained here since it allows better
separation of the intrinsically different tasks and offers the possibility of
pipelined parallelism on separate hardware if message traffic volumes war-
rant or require classification rates that cannot be achieved by a single pro-
cessor. Furthermore, multistage SVMs have been considered more effective
than single stage SVM in other classification tasks [99, 115].
The first stage follows a deterministic lexical analysis. Given the formal
grammar definition of the messages of the SIP protocol (and thus, the
syntax of all SIP messages), the implementation of the lexical analyzer can
be realized by any of the standard tools (for example, lex) that are available
under Unix to parse a program written in a given programming language.
The task here is actually even simpler since, the processing can be stopped
immediately upon detection of the first syntax error since there is no need
to extract a list of errors present in the whole message. The second and
third stage are meant to detect crooked and malicious messages.
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SVM for SIP Message Classification
As mentioned earlier, we have used two separate SVM classifiers to fil-
ter crooked and malicious SIP messages. The syntactically well-formed
SIP messages that are successfully parsed by the lexical analyzer are fur-
ther processed by a specialized kind of tokenization, where the tokens are
significant features extracted from the SIP messages; these features are
represented as numerical vectors in features space and these vectors are
used by the subsequent SVM classifiers. The goal of this feature selection
process is to reduce the computational burden and to extract appropriate
information as a SIP message contains huge amount of information. These
features are selected by expert knowledge about VoIP systems and they
take into consideration aspects related to the contents of each message, as
well as the distribution in time and kind of a stream of messages.
• Structure & Content Related: These features are extracted from
individual SIP messages. A list of these features is found in Appendix
A. These features characterize the structure and the content of a SIP
message (e.g., protocol version, hierarchical structure of a message,
frequency of request- line, empty line and mandatory unique header
field, value of scalar fields in a message, etc). These features are used
to train the first SVM classifier for detection of crooked messages.
• Time and Kind Distribution of SIP Message Stream: While
the identification of syntactically and semantically incorrect SIP mes-
sages is possible by controlling individual messages, the detection of
malicious content is greatly facilitated by examining features that take
into account the time and dimension of traces obtained from a SIP
message stream.
Features that are extracted from the syntactically well-formed and mean-
ingful SIP messages are listed in Table 6.1. These features are extracted
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Table 6.1: List of features characterizing the distribution of SIP message stream
Feature
Percentages of the un-established call at time t.
Percentages of the calls with very low inter-arrival time at time t
Percentages of the calls with high call set up delay at time t
Rejection Ratio - Percentages of the canceled calls at time t
Success Ratio - Percentages of the successful calls at time t
Number of INVITE messages arrived at time t
Number of REGISTER messages arrived at time t
Number of 200 OK response messages arrived at time t
Number of CANCEL messages arrived at time t
Number of BYE messages arrived at time t
from the stream of SIP messages after each δt time interval. Let us define
the set of features found in Table 6.1 as X and
X(t) = {x1(t), x2(t), x3(t), x4(t), x5(t)} is the vector of features extracted
at time t, while t = t + δt. Thus, at the beginning while t = 0, the set
of feature would be X(0). The choice of δt usually depends on the mes-
sage arrival rate of the SIP-based networks. In this context, we choose
δt = 10 min, while, it can be even sufficiently low (for example: 0.5 sec)
for a very large networks.
Two of these features (e.g., percentages of the calls with very low inter-
arrival time and expected call that arrived till time t) depends on threshold
values (e.g., low threshold of inter-arrival time and number of expected
calls at time t). We have defined the suitable values of these thresholds
considering the size and message arrival rate of our network.
Training of SVM classifier
We have used the freely available library LibSVM [27] for Support Vector
Machines. The SVMs are trained by presenting each SVM with a set of
lexically correct SIP messages that have been pre-labeled as −1 (accepted)
and +1 (rejected).
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The training phase determines a configuration for each of the two SVMs
that will result in a good classification of subsequent messages contained
in a test set. Our experimental results show that SIP message vectors
are not linearly separable, so the feature vectors are projected to a higher
dimensional space by performing a vector product by a kernel. Care must
be exercised in the selection of the specific kernel used and in the choice of
some relevant parameters. To this end, experiments are carried out with
various kernels and parameters. It is very obvious that the linear kernel
do not yield any interesting result and hence the experimentations have
focused on polynomial kernels of degree 2, 3, and 4 and on RBF kernels.
The latter are reported in the literature as leading to good results and so
are deemed preferable despite their higher computational cost. However,
in the support documents available with LibSVM it is mentioned that in
the case of data with a large number of features (as in our case), sometime
a low degree polynomial kernel is preferable. Our experiments confirmed
the validity of this suggestion – at least for our specific application.
6.2 Results and Performance
Performance evaluation of any classifier can be established by analyzing the
results over a statistically relevant collection of data. In this context, this
means that a large number of SIP traces would be needed. We have used
both real SIP traces collected from our institution and synthetic traces
generated by our developed traffic generator. Details about the traffic
collection, anonymization and generation is discussed in Chapter 5.
The first SVM, used for detection of crooked messages, is trained with
a set of 2000 pre-classified examples (a balanced mix of good and bad
messages) where each sample message is transformed into vectors of 26
features. For this classifier, the test set contains the unlabeled SIP message
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Table 6.2: Description of Real SIP Traces
Description Number of Msg
Total Message 242,714,093
Message with Syntax Error 2,627
Syntactically well-formed but “bad” message 0
Syntactically well-formed and “good” message 242,711,466
vectors that are syntactically well-formed but may contains semantic errors.
Again, the second SVM classifier, used for detection of malicious messages,
is trained with a set of 1000 pre-classified examples (a balanced mix of good
and bad messages) where each sample message is transformed into vectors
of 10 features. For this classifier, the test set contains the unlabeled SIP
message vectors that are both syntactically and semantically well-formed,
but may contain malicious contents.
6.2.1 SIP Dataset
The set of the collected sample from our institution consisting of around
two years SIP traces is used here for experimental purpose. Details about
the dataset are found in Table 6.2. Out of over 242 millions messages in
the data set, only 2, 627 contains syntax errors in optional header fields; all
of them are duly rejected by the lexical analyzer. The remaining messages
are passed to the first SVM classifier for next level filtering; those messages
were all “good” messages and the SVM did not reject any of them.
In the messages collected at our institution, there were no “bad” mes-
sages what so ever, which perhaps could be expected. There were neither
“crooked” messages, nor “malicious” messages sent with the intention of
creating disruptions of service or of harming the network. To counteract
the lack of “bad” SIP messages in our collected sample, synthetic “bad”
messages generated by “SIP-Msg-Gen” (described in Section 5.2) are in-
jected into the stream of real SIP messages collected at our institution.
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Table 6.3: Description of synthetic “malformed”, “crooked” and “tortured” messages in
dataset
Synthetic Test Scenarios Number of Msg
Malformed Messages 3,000,000
Syntax Error in “Request/Response Line” of a message
Syntax Error in header fields of a “Request” message
Syntax Error in header fields of a “Response” message
Syntax Error in body of a message
Null entry for mandatory header fields
Crooked Messages 5,000,000
Injected SQL code with the aim of gaining unauthorized access
Multiple “Request/Response Line” in a message
Unknown/Invalid Protocol version
Missing mandatory header fields a message
Duplicate entry for unique header fields
Presence of garbage string after message body
Hierarchical disorder of message structure
Overlarge/Zero/Negative value of scalar field
Missing/multiple empty line in a message
Mismatch between Method name and CSeq Method Name
Presence of Request and Response line in a messages
Missing Mandatory header fields in a Request Message
Unknown scheme for “Request-URI”, header fields and message body
Unknown Method Name and Response status
Unknown scheme for message body
Multiple Values in Single Value Required Optional Fields
Tortured Messages 2,000,000
Overlarge Message Body
Unknown header fields
Extra white spaces between colons, semicolons, header field values
Use of extra colons, semicolons in header fields
Use of Escaped characters in messages
Presence of empty optional header fields and parameters
Line folding all over the message
Presence of unknown and unusual header fields
Integer fields (Max-Forwards and CSeq) with leading zeros
The nature of the errors in these additional messages generated by “SIP-
Msg-Gen” is described in Table 6.3.
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The generation of “malicious” synthetic messages is aimed at stimulat-
ing an attack which will most certainly be characterized by a departure
from a “normal” trace. Hence, we preliminary have performed a rough
analysis to determine the characteristics of a “normal” trace, so that syn-
thetic “bad” messages added to the trace can simulate an attack event or
an intrusion attempt. To this end, we have examined the SIP traces col-
lected over a period of eight months and split them among 24 time slots,
one for each hour of the day. Features such as average arrival rate of call,
register requests, traffic degradation ratio in the weekends, etc. are then
extracted for each time slot. The values of these features are used to estab-
lish a base-line. A message flooding attack is simulated by instructing the
“SIP-Msg-Gen” to generate a large number of SIP requests (here we use
only INVITE and REGISTER request methods) with a rate that is much
higher (two to three times) than the average rate in a normal situation.
We have also created a few legitimate traffic surge scenarios which should
not produce false positive classifications. Flooding attacks resembles legit-
imate traffic surges in the message arrival rate, but they differ in the fact
that the legitimate high-rate INVITE tend to successfully establish a call
through the standard three-way handshake INVITE/200 0K/ACK (Fig. 6.2
(a)) and terminate with a corresponding BYE message, while flooding at-
tacks simply send a INVITE or REQUEST messages at high rate, without
waiting for the full handshake to come through (Fig. 6.2 (b)).
Finally, call tear down attack scenarios are constructed by injecting
a good amount of call requests (INVITE) messages and later those are
rejected with CANCEL messages.
6.2.2 Kernel Selection and Parameter Estimation
Effective use of SVM requires an understanding of its parameters and their
influence over classification accuracy [28]. In particular, the selection of a
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Figure 6.2: Behavior of SIP protocol attribute during (a) real legitimate normal traffic,
and (b)INVITE flooding attack
Table 6.4: Description of synthetic “malicious” scenarios in the dataset
Scenario Description Duration Test
Cases
Total Mes-
sages
INVITE Flooding Peak-hour in Weekdays 10 min 20 40,000
INVITE Flooding Peak-hour in Weekdays 30 min 10 30,000
INVITE Flooding In Weekends 10 min 10 1000
REGISTER Flooding Peak-hour in Weekdays 30 min 10 20,000
REGISTER Flooding Off Peak-hour in Weekdays 10 min 10 2,000
Call TearDown Attack Peak-hour in Weekdays 10 min 10 5,000
Call TearDown Attack Peak-hour in Weekdays 10 min 10 5,000
specific kernel function (such as linear, Radial Basis Functions (RBF), poly-
nomial, etc.) and tuning of the kernel parameters (such as the RBF kernel
parameter γ or the degree for polynomial kernel) can strongly influence
the accuracy of the SVM classification. Another important parameter is
the so called soft margin constant C which controls the trade-off between
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maximizing the margin and minimizing the training error.
There are no specific algorithms or techniques for selecting the most
promising SVM configuration parameters, as this, much like in other ma-
chine learning techniques, turns out to be data dependent. However, there
are several guidelines that help in parameter selection. As suggested in
the support guide of LibSVM [87]) we made use of the widely used cross-
validation technique [39] to estimate the probability of test error of a learn-
ing algorithm. In our search for a suitable parameter configuration, we
performed a k-fold cross-validation. In our case we have used k=10 which
means that the 800 SIP messages that were used for training of the SVM
were randomly assigned to k=10 subsets. Each subset was then tested
(validated) using the classifier trained on the remaining (k − 1) subsets
using a specific set of parameters. The k results are averaged to obtain a
single index. The entire process was repeated for each set of parameters.
Finally, the parameters with the best cross-validation index were selected.
This test was performed for three kernel functions: linear, RBF, and poly-
nomial – and for various values of their relevant parameters, as shown in
Table 6.5. The kernel function that is the easiest to tune is the linear ker-
nel, as it has only the single C parameter to adjust. However, as expected,
it did not perform well for this dataset. We then turned our attention to
the RBF kernel that is often recommended despite its higher computational
cost. Nevertheless, as shown in Table 6.5, its cross-validation accuracy with
0 < σ ≤ 1 is very low for small values of C (soft margin constant), although
the accuracy increases as the value of C increases. However, small values
of C are generally preferable since small values of C tend to emphasize the
margin while ignoring the outliers in the training data and – conversely –
large values of C increase the possibility of over fitting the training data.
Overall, the RBF kernels were not satisfactory. The performance for var-
ious pairs of (C, d) values (C = 2−1, 20, 22, 23... and d = 2, 3, 4, ....) were
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Table 6.5: Cross-Validation accuracy of different kernel functions and parameters
Soft Margin
Constant,C
Kernel Function Accuracy
Polynomial (degree 2) 99.23%
Polynomial (degree 3) 97.56%
2−1 Polynomial (degree 4) 96.27%
Radial basis function (σ=0.4) 46.40%
Linear 47.64%
Polynomial (degree 2) 99.96%
Polynomial (degree 3) 97.56%
20 Polynomial (degree 4) 96.50%
Radial basis function (σ=0.4) 52.74%
Linear 47.64%
Polynomial (degree 2) 99.23%
Polynomial (degree 3) 97.16%
22 Polynomial (degree 4) 96.59%
Radial basis function (σ=0.4) 88.21%
Linear 47.64%
Polynomial (degree 2) 99.23%
Polynomial (degree 3) 97.02%
23 Polynomial (degree 4) 96.65%
Radial basis function (σ=0.4) 91.03%
Linear 47.64%
evaluated through cross-validation and is shown in Table 6.5. The best
combination was obtained for the pair C=1, d=2, indicating that a sec-
ond degree polynomial is flexible enough to discriminate between the two
classes with a reasonably small soft margin.
6.2.3 Performance Evaluation
The performance of the proposed architecture is measured through its effi-
ciency, which is defined by the classification accuracy, and its effectiveness,
which is the time/effort needed for classification.
The mixed dataset (combination of real and synthetic SIP messages
described in 6.2.1) contains 252, 817, 093 SIP messages. The achieved ac-
curacy by the two classifiers is reported in the Table 6.6.
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Table 6.6: SIP message classification result using SVMs
Description Num. of Msg
Total Message 252,817,093
Real SIP messages (“good”) 242,711,466
Real SIP messages with syntax error 2,627
Synthetic Message with syntax error 3,000,000
Synthetic (well-formed but not meaningful) 5,000,000
Synthetic (valid but “tortured”) 2,000,000
Synthetic (well-formed and meaningful but malicious) 103,000 (80 scenarios)
Result of Lexical Analysis
Discarded “malformed” Messages 3,002,627
Well-formed Messages (without syntax error) 249,814,466
First SVM Classifier Result(Detection of “crooked” messages)
Number of Messages passed from lexical analyzer 249,814,466
True positive(“bad” message identified as “bad”) 4,976,016
False positive(“good” message identified as “bad”) 28,739
True negative(“good” message identified as “good”) 244,785,727
False negative(“bad” message identified as “good”) 23,984
Accuracy 99.97%
Second SVM Classifier Result (Detection of “malicious” sce-
narios)
True positive(“malicious” scenarios identified as “malicious”) 78
False positive(“good” scenarios identified as “malicious”) 0
True negative(“good” scenarios identified as “good”) 0
False negative(“malicious” scenarios identified as “good”) 2
Accuracy 97%
All experiments are done in a machine of Intel Core i7 CPU, 2.0 GHz
Quad-core and 8 GB RAM memory. The average time for the proposed
filtering system to classify a SIP message is 0.50 millisecond/msg. This
time is the aggregation of processing time of individual filtering stage.
It is found that about 0.40 millisecond/msg time is required by the
lexical analyzer to perform syntax checking of a SIP message, while the
two SVMs require 0.05 millisecond/msg each.
We have also looked at the latency between the onset of an attack and
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the time elapsed before the second SVM can detect it. In the test cases
of attack scenarios (described in Table 6.4), the attack starts slowly from
zero and increases until it reaches the maximum rate, then, the maximum
rate is maintained constant until the attack stops. We noticed that the
SVM classifier is able to detect the attacks as soon as the traffic reaches
the maximum rate.
For example, among one of the attack test scenarios, excessive amount
of call requests (INVITE) messages are injected into the good trace during
9.00-9.10 am in the morning on a Monday. The SVM classifier observes
every SIP messages from 9.00 am and during 9.02 am it notices that the
arrival of INVITE messages is much higher than the expected legitimate
call request arrival rate at that specific hour of a week-day, percentages of
the un-established and the percentage of the calls with very low interarrival
time is high (than normal rate). These features indicate the occurrence of
the call flooding attack and thus the classifier announces that the system
is under attack.
Experiments with “inviteflood”
The performance of our proposed filtering system is also tested through
“inviteflood”1 which a publicly available security testing tool implemented
by the author of [48] to perform SIP/SDP INVITE message flooding over
UDP/IP. We use Asterisk IP PBX as the VoIP server as the attack tool
is designed to use this. As the VoIP client, X-lite2, an well-known soft
phone application for desktop and mobile platforms, is used. To imitate
the flooding attack scenario, we first create a small set of legitimate users by
registering ten SIP accounts on the server. We have prepared a script that
generates “good” calls among these user accounts for a specific duration of
1“inviteflood” - http://www.hackingvoip.com/tools/inviteflood.tar.gz
2X-Lite softphone :http://www.counterpath.com/softphone-clients.html
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Table 6.7: Experiments performed on traces generated by “inviteflood” tool
Description Value
Duration 4 hours
Total Call Requests 4,000
Number of “flooding” attack scenarios 10 (10 min each)
Second SVM Classifier Result
True positive(“malicious” scenarios identified as “malicious”) 9
False positive(“good” scenarios identified as “malicious”) 0
True negative(“good” scenarios identified as “good”) 0
False negative(“malicious” scenarios identified as “good”) 1
time. On the other hand, using “inviteflood” tool a large number of call
request are directed towards the set of “good” users by spoofing five SIP
uris (“malicious” users). These calls are captured using the widely used
open-source packet analyzer Wireshark3. Details about experiments with
the tool “inviteflood” and performance accuracy is found in Table 6.7.
Experiments with PROTOS Test Suite
An experiments is performed using the publicly available PROTOS test
suits to check the performance of our proposed filtering architecture. PRO-
TOS test suite4 is developed [201] for use in the evaluation of the imple-
mentation level security and robustness of SIP implementations.
PROTOS Test-suite:c07-sip contains 4527 test cases while the scope is
only limited to the SIP INVITE messages. According to the given de-
scription of this dataset, 1 message is valid while the remaining 4526 mes-
sages are defined as exceptional. By the term exceptional the authors [201]
mean messages that can violate the protocol specification, but often it is
legal or in the hazy region between legal and illegal constructs. Among
these exceptional messages, 193 messages are contain error in SIP method
name (e.g., overflow-general, overflow-space, overflow-null, fmtstring, utf-
3Wireshark : http://www.wireshark.org/
4PROTOS Project, https://www.ee.oulu.fi/research/ouspg/PROTOS_Test-Suite_c07-sip
112
6.2. RESULTS AND PERFORMANCE
Table 6.8: SVM Classification result using PROTOS dataset
Description Num. of Msg
True positive(“bad” message identified as “bad”) 4288
False positive(“good” message identified as “bad”) 0
True negative(“good” message identified as “good”) 239
False negative(“bad” message identified as “good”) 0
8, ansi-escape), 75 SIP messages contain error in SIP version description,
61 messages contain exceptional elements in SIP request URI, 2097 mes-
sages contain exceptional elements in various header fields, and finally 2100
messages contain error in the message body.
We performed an experiment with this PROTOS test suits and the
classification result obtained from our proposed filtering system is found
in Table 6.8.
6.2.4 Dimension Reduction
For each SIP message in the dataset (training and testing) a vector of 26
features was extracted. However, working with such a high-dimensional
space is computationally heavy and perhaps unnecessary as some of the
features thus extracted show to be correlated to one another. Hence, we
used Principal Component Analysis (PCA) [94] to reduce the number of
features used to represent data. The resulting dimensionality reduction
would provide a simpler representation for the data, a reduction of the
memory requirements and ultimately, a faster classification.
The result of applying PCA to our dataset is summarized in Fig. 6.3
which shows the “variance” and the “cumulative proportion of variance” of
the derived principal components and from which we can see that the first
four principal components that are maximally correlated already contain
92% of the information carried by the original 26 features and the first 17
principal components contain 100% of the information. This led to a third
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Figure 6.3: Results of Principal Component Analysis, (a) variance, and (b) cumulative
proportion of principal components
experiment, in which the performance of the SVM classifier was evaluated
when using only the first 17 principal components instead of the original
26 features. As expected, the accuracy of the classification using only the
17 principal components is almost as high as the one obtained using the
original 26 features (99.45% v. 99.97%, respectively).
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Social Behavior Analysis of VoIP
Users and its application to
Malicious Users Detection
7.1 Description of the Dataset and Basic
Characteristics
A sub-set of the collected SIP traffic from our institution is used for this
analysis. The sub-set consists of SIP messages for a period of one and a
half year (July 2012- December 2013). Around two million call attempts
are retrieved from the captured 146 million SIP messages, among these one
million calls are successfully established. For our analysis purpose each call
is represented as a CDR (Call Detail Record) where each CDR consists of
5-tuples {x, y, t, l, n}, where user x is the caller, user y is the callee, t is
the time of the call arrival, l is the duration of the call and n is the call
status (e.g., successful or canceled). Fig. 7.1 shows the average call arrival
rate per day in the dataset. Based on the arrival pattern of call request
(INVITE message), it is noticed that the busy hour starts from around 8
am and ends around 5 pm. Fig. 7.2 shows the average interarrival time
of call requests during weekdays and weekends. Fig. 7.3 shows that the
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Figure 7.1: SIP INVITE Message arrival pattern in captured trace.
interarrival time of the call requests during the peak hours in weekdays
follows exponential distribution.
Call Establishment Time
The average time for establishment of a call through a three-way handshake
of INVITE/200 OK/ACK messages is shown in Fig. 7.4. Fig. 7.5 shows the
distribution of the call establishment time during weekdays.
Call Duration Distribution
Fig. 7.6 shows the distribution of call durations during the observation pe-
riod. For this plot, all the calls including unsuccessful ones are considered.
That is why Fig. 7.6 shows a huge amount of calls with call duration less
than 10 seconds which indicates the amount of rejected or canceled calls.
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Figure 7.2: Average Interarrival time of SIP INVITE Messages in a day(8 am - 7 pm).
7.2 Social Behavior Analysis of VoIP Users
With the widespread adoption of SIP-based VoIP, understanding the char-
acteristics of SIP traffic and the behavior of VoIP users is critical to problem
diagnosis and security protection of IP Telephony. Information about the
social behavioral patterns of the users is quite important in anomaly detec-
tion as these systems suspect potential intrusion by identifying deviations
from the normal and legitimate behavior patterns of users and traffic.
To this end, we have analyzed the communication patterns of a large
number of VoIP users with the aim to model the normal behavior of the
users. A part of this work submitted for the peer-review is found in [55].
The behavior of the users can be modeled either on an individual or on
a group basis, in such a way that the model captures the essence of the
user’s social behavior. Though it is quite common to analyze the individual
117
CHAPTER 7. SOCIAL BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS OF VOIP USERS
Interarrival Time (sec) of Calls [bin size=0.5 sec]
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
20
0
40
0
60
0
80
0
Figure 7.3: Distribution of Interarrival Time of Call Request in weekdays (8 am- 5pm).
attributes to understand user behavior (e.g., the average billing, frequency,
amount and time of service usage, etc), following such brute-force approach
to individually characterize millions of users is not a wise-decision in the
context of telecommunication, where the network is huge.
7.2.1 Networks in Social Sciences
The concept of network in Social Sciences refers to the theoretical construct
that is used to demonstrate the relationships between social entities such
as, individuals, groups, organizations, etc. A social network is usually rep-
resented as a graph which comprised of a set of nodes or vertices connected
by one or more links or edges. In this context, nodes are different social
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Figure 7.4: Computation of a call establishment time.
entities and the various relations which connect them are defined as links.
A social network may be undirected, meaning that there is no distinction
between the two vertices associated with each edge, or its edges may be
directed from one vertex to the other. Various methods known as social
network analysis (SNA) techniques [200] are applied on a social network
to explore the social interaction pattern of users. For example, degree, be-
tweenness and closeness centrality [19,21] are well-established and popular
concepts to measure the social status and influence of a person inside a
social network.
The notion of social network can be applied in the telecom networks too,
where social networks of users are built based on their telephony records.
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Figure 7.5: Distribution of Call Establishment Time.
Besides the individual user analysis, SNA techniques are very promising
to analyze the complex behavior of telecom users [32, 135, 140, 174, 197]
at different time-scales and at different levels of interpretation. In fact,
application of SNA techniques in large amounts of telecom data is usually
more relevant to reveal the behavioral patterns of users inside the network
than the analysis of attributes of the individuals.
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Figure 7.6: Distribution of Call Duration.
7.2.2 Social Networks of VoIP Users
After an initial analysis of the CDRs extracted from the captured SIP
traces, a total of 126, 582 users1 (SIP URIs) are found that appeared at least
once during the whole observation window. In this context, we consider
each SIP URI as an individual user. Of those, 8, 972 are found to be
internal users and the remaining 117, 610 are identified as external users.
The set of internal users consists of the SIP URIs of SIP end-points (e.g.,
softphones, IP phones, fax machines, etc) associated with administrative,
1We have excluded the SIP URIs from unknown sources.
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Table 7.1: Number of users and percentage of calls generated by user groups
User Group Num of Users Call Percentage
Internal Active Users 2,551 68%
Internal Inactive Users 6,421 7%
External Active Users 475 6%
External Inactive Users 117,135 19%
technical, teaching and research stuffs, while, the set of external users
contains SIP URIs of SIP end-points (e.g., IP phone, mobile, land line, fax
machines, etc) outside the university domain. In this study, we construct
a social network of these VoIP users from the data set consisting of their
VoIP phone call records over a period of one year.
We have noticed that the activity level of a large number of users (both
“internal” and “external”) is very low. The activity level of a user is mea-
sured by the frequency of dialed and received calls by him/her. It is found
that a large number of users appear only once or twice during the whole
observation window to generate or receive calls. Thus, an activity thresh-
old is used to differentiate the least active users from the most active ones.
The threshold is defined based on the observed average activity level of
users during the observation window. A user is defined as active if he/she
remains active for at least 25% of the time of the observation period to gen-
erate or receive calls. This indicates that an active user dials or receives
successful calls for at least 137 days (can be non-consecutive) during the
observation window of total 548 days. The activity threshold is applied to
both sets of internal and external users to divide them into groups of active,
and inactive users. Table 7.1 shows the number of users and percentages
of calls generated by the four user groups.
In our endeavor to construct a “social network” from the CDRs, we first
concentrate on properly defining the set of “nodes” connected by one or
more “links” (e.g., distinct types of relationships between “nodes”). In the
context of VoIP, it is quite common that “nodes” are assigned to users and
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“links” are the communication (e.g., call, sms, video chat, etc) between
them. A “link” in a social communication network can be characterized
by several attributes such as, the frequency of communication, duration
of communication, number of common neighbors, time since the last com-
munication, etc. Each attribute has a different predictive power that also
depends on the time scale at which we observe the “link”.
We have only considered the set of “internal active” users (as “nodes”)
to build the social communication network. We have excluded the other
groups of users shown in Table 7.1 because their activity is very limited
during the observation window. It is found that a large number of users
among 126, 582 users appear a very few times to make or receive calls
during the one and a half year. Analyzing the behavior of a large number
of inactive users does not provide any helpful indication in modeling the
overall behavior and characteristics of the users of our considered telephony
network. Moreover, if we consider the whole set of users to build the social
network, then the network becomes huge, with a really large number of
“nodes” (total 126, 582 users) and “links” (here, communication between
users).
First, we build a caller-callee “social network” between the “internal
active” users where the “link” between two “internal active” users is char-
acterized by only the frequency of communication between them. This is a
directed weighted call graph G(V,E), where, V (G) is the set of “vertices”
representing the “internal active” users and E(G) is the set of “edges”
between them. An “edge” exists between two users if they have at least
communicated once during the observation window and the weight of the
“edge” is the frequency of communication between them. We measure the
density of the call graph G(V,E) to reveal how closely the group of “in-
ternal active” users are connected. Density of a graph is measured by the
percentage of the number of actual ties/connection/links presents in the
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group relative to the number of possible links in the group (i.e., if everyone
had a relationship with everyone else in the group). Density of the call
graph G(V,E) is 0.023 which indicates that the graph is very sparse (in-
ternal communication between the “internal active” users is not frequent).
It is found that, this call graph captures only 10% information of the total
calls generated during the observation window. Call graph G(V,E) only
explores the inter and intra departmental communication structure of the
institute, it does not reveal the structure of social relationships of the “in-
ternal active” users with the outside world. This indicates that, a “link”
between two users characterized by only the number of calls between them
is not sufficient to capture the whole social relationship pattern of those
users. Along with the frequency of communication between two users, few
other features, such as the number of common neighbors, duration of com-
munication can be helpful to predict the persistence of a “link” at a larger
time scale.
Considering this, to explore the social connections between the group
of “internal active” and other “internal” and “external” users , we have
build another call graph G1(V,E) by redefining the “links” between users.
The call graph G1(V,E) is an undirected weighted graph, where, V (G1)
is the set of “vertices” representing the “internal active” users and E(G1)
is the set of “edges” between them. Here, an “edge”/“link” between two
users refers to the strength of social tie between them. The strength of the
social tie between two users is expressed by a value in the range of 0 to 1.
It is measured by the similarity of their call patterns (e.g., the number of
common friends) and intensity of their internal communication (e.g., the
frequency of communication).
• Intensity of internal Communication, IC(i, j):
This is measured by taking account the percentage of dialed calls
between two users over the total number of calls generated by them.
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For example, internal communication between users i and j is defined
as follows:
IC(i, j) = Num. of calls between user i and jTotal num. of calls by i + Total num. of calls by j
• Similarity of Call Pattern, J(i, j):
Similarity of call pattern between two users is measured by consid-
ering the number of their common neighbors/friends. We measure it
by using the Jaccard similarity coefficient2 which a frequently used
statistic measure for comparing the similarity and diversity of sample
sets. It is defined as the size of the intersection divided by the size of
the union of the sample sets. In this context, it is used to measure the
percentage of common friends between two users. For example, the
Jaccard similarity coefficient between user i and j is defined as follows:
J(i, j) = |A∩B||A∪B|
where A and B are the sets of users called by user i and
by user j, respectively.
The social similarity/relationship measure, Sim(i,j) between two users i
and j is then defined as the sum of the two indices above:
Sim(i,j)= J(i,j) + IC(i,j)
7.2.3 Community Detection
“Social networks” are built assuming that people are all interdependent
inside a network. A typical observation is that, usually a member is linked
to many other members, but not necessarily to all other member in the
network. This introduces the concept of community structure, in which
2Jaccard, Paul.“The distribution of the flora in the alpine zone.1.” New phytologist 11.2 (1912):37-50.
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network “nodes” are joined together based on their behavior similarity
in tightly-knit groups between which there are only looser connections.
The concept of community is one of everyday familiarity and ubiquitous in
society.
Community detection and analysis in a social network is quite relevant
for revealing distinctive patterns of users inside networks. In telecommu-
nication, for instance, where the entire network is huge and sparse, de-
composition of the network into small communities (e.g., sets of highly
interconnected nodes) is a promising approach to retrieve comprehensive
information about the huge network. Identifications of smaller internal
communities is helpful to discover complex social interaction pattern cap-
turing highly connected circles of friends, families, or professional cliques
in the observed network. Thus, the issue of detection and characterization
of community structure in “social networks” has received a considerable
amount of attention [16, 33, 69, 111, 130, 142]. We have performed differ-
ent experiments to explore different community structures in the social
network of the VoIP users (call graph G1(V,E)) that is represented in sub-
section 7.2.2. We want to discover structures in our social communication
network rather than imposing a certain size of community or fix the num-
ber of communities. To this end, we go for unsupervised clustering to find
out k communities. K-means clustering algorithm [78, 98], a widely used
machine learning technique for unsupervised classification of data, is used
here to divide the set of 2, 551 “internal active” users into pre-defined k
communities/clusters3 where users inside a community are of similar so-
cial behavior. Briefly, the k-means clustering algorithm takes a set of n
observations and a (fixed) integer k (1 <= k <= n) and proceeds to par-
tition the n observations into k clusters so that observations belonging to
3We use the terms community and cluster as synonyms in this paper although in other contexts they
may acquire slightly different meanings.
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the same cluster to have a high “similarity” measure, while observations
belonging to different clusters should have a very low “similarity” measure.
Intuitively, observations in a cluster should be “densely packed”, while dif-
ferent clusters should be well “separated” from one another. Fig. 7.7 shows
an example of clustering using k-means algorithm.
Intra-cluster
variance is 
minimized
Inter-cluster
variance is 
maximized
Figure 7.7: Example: k-means clustering.
Determining the number of Communities/Clusters (k)
Determining the optimal number of communities/clusters is essential for
effective and efficient data clustering. The correct choice of k is often am-
biguous and depends on the shape and scale of the distribution of points
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in a data set. There are several techniques of choosing the suitable num-
ber of clusters. Though neither of them guarantee to discover the “best”
solution, but, can give an idea of the possible community structures.
We have started with the common method which is to compare the
intra-cluster variance for a number of cluster solutions. It is noted that
increasing k (number of cluster) without penalty will always reduce the
amount of error in the resulting clustering process, to the extreme case
of zero error if each data point is considered its own cluster (i.e., when
k equals to the number of data points, n). Intuitively then, the optimal
choice of k will strike a balance between maximum compression of the data
using a single cluster, and maximum accuracy by assigning each data point
to its own cluster.
The plot (in Fig. 7.8) of the intra-cluster variance (“within cluster sum
of squares (WSS)”) against a series of sequential clusters (here, 2<k<20)
on our dataset provides a useful graphical way to choose an appropriate
number of clusters with lowest intra-cluster distance. Intra-cluster distance
of a cluster i is measured by the sum of squared Euclidean distances be-
tween the data instances and its center. It is known as “within cluster sum
of squares (WSS)” and is calculated as :
∑
xji∈Si
(xji − ci)
2
, where ci is the centroid of i
th cluster (7.1)
Total “WSS” for k clusters can be evaluated as :
k∑
i=1
∑
xji∈Si
(xji − ci)
2
(7.2)
Usually for a clearly separable data set the reduction in “WSS” drops dra-
matically till a point with the increase of the number of cluster (k) and
after that it reaches a plateau. This produces an “elbow” (The largest
magnitude difference between two points) in the plot. The location of the
“elbow” in the resulting plot indicates [103, 159, 186] that a satisfactory
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number of clusters have been reached. This “elbow” cannot always be un-
ambiguously identified. For example, in case of our dataset we do not find
such a sharp reduction (“elbow”) of “WSS” with the increase of the num-
ber of cluster (shown in Fig. 7.8). Thus, we cannot conclude any suitable
solution that has a substantial impact on the clustering solutions.
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Figure 7.8: Intra-cluster distance for different values of k (number of clusters).
The modularity maximization approach is another widely used methods
for community detection. Modularity is used to measure the strength of
division of a network into communities. Networks with high modularity
have dense connections between the nodes within communities but sparse
connections between nodes in different communities. The modularity max-
imization method detects communities by searching over possible divisions
of a network with high modularity. Here, we have used Louvain modularity
method [16], a popular heuristic method based on modularity optimization
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algorithm, to discover communities in our social communication network of
VoIP users. This community detection algorithm is applied on call graph
G1(V,E) (described in sub-section 7.2.2) in which “nodes” are the group
of “internal active” users and “links” are characterized by the strength of
social tie between them. At first, the community detection algorithm sug-
gests a high number of communities for the call graph G1(V,E) due to the
reason that it is too sparse with a large number of “internal active” users
with very low similarity. After filtering the “nodes” with similarity below
0.2, the community detection algorithm suggests that the remaining 87%
of users can be divided into 15-20 communities.
We have also followed the expectation maximization in Gaussian Mix-
ture Models to solve the problem of determining the optimum number of
clusters [58]. Here, we assume that our dataset x is drawn from k Gaussian
distributions,
f(x) =
∑k
i=1 λifi(x),
where fi is the probability density function of the observations in group k,
and λi is the probability that an observation comes from the k
th mixture
component (λi ∈ (0, 1) and ∑ki=1 λi = 1). The Expectation-Maximization
algorithm is used to estimate the parameter (number of Gaussian distri-
butions in the mixture density/number of cluster) through maximum like-
lihood. In selecting the “best” model that fits our data, we extend the
use of Expectation-Maximization algorithm within a varying range of pos-
sible number of clusters (1<k<20) and then models are compared using
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) [162], a statistical criterion for model
selection. Fig. 7.9 shows the result of such model based approach. Model
with the highest BIC indicates the “best” model to fit the data. Fig. 7.9
shows that the best model is “VEV” which indicates that the model is
ellipsoidal with 15/16 components/clusters where the shapes of all clusters
are equal while their volume and orientation may vary. Details about all
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Figure 7.9: Selection of best model using Bayesian information criterion (BIC).
the models is found in [59]. Based on the above experiments we decide to
choose k= 15 as the suitable number of communities/clusters to divide our
social network.
7.2.4 Community Analysis & Profile Extraction
By applying the k-means clustering algorithm the set of “internal active”
users are divided into 15 communities/clusters. Fig. 7.10 shows the 15
clusters of users in two dimensional space. In the figure the clusters are
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Table 7.2: Importance of 12 components
Comp. No 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Standard deviation 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05
Proportion of Variance 0.15 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05
Cumulative Proportion 0.15 0.28 0.39 0.49 0.57 0.65 0.72 0.78 0.84 0.90 0.95 1.00
not clearly distinguishable as the first two components cover only 28% of
the total variance (shown in Table 7.2) among the 12 components/features
that are used to describe our dataset.
Fig. 7.11 shows the call flow between clusters of “internal active” users,
and the remaining users groups (e.g., “internal inactive”, “external active”
and “external inactive”).
We perform a deep analysis of these observed communities/clusters of
users to discover the patters of social relationships inside each community.
This analysis helps us to explore and model the normal and legitimate be-
havioral profile of the “internal” users. This study of communities, whether
densely or sparsely connected, is quite relevant to apply distinct security
solutions for users with different behavioral profiles.
A list of features used to describe the social behavioral patterns of users
is described below. The following two metrics are used to describe the
structure and cohesion of a community/cluster:
• Network Density–Density captures how closely a community is con-
nected. It is measured by the percentage of the number of actual
ties/connection/links presents in the group relative to the number of
possible links in the group (i .e., if everyone has a relationship with
everyone else in the group).
• Average path length–It is the measure of the average length that one
requires to reach any node from any other node in the network.
The following three features are used to explore the interactivity and
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Figure 7.10: Clusters of users based on social behavior similarity. Clusters are not clearly
separable using only two components.
dynamicity of users inside a community:
• Interactivity of User–Defined by the ratio of the incoming and
outgoing calls (of a user) during the observation period.
Interactivity of User A = Dialed Call by User AReceived Call by User A
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Figure 7.11: Communication between user groups. Vertex label C1-C15 indicates clusters
of “internal active” users, II, EA and EI indicates “internal inactive”, “external active”
and “external inactive” users. Size of the vertex corresponds to the size of the user group,
smallest one indicates at least 50 users. The thinnest edge between two groups indicates
at least 4000 calls.)
• Activity Duration of User–Defined by the ratio of the time a user
remains active and the total observation window.
Activity Duration of user A = Period when user A remain activeTotal observation period
• Dynamicity & Sociality of Users–A user is called “social” if he
intend to call to a variety of people instead of maintaining communi-
cation only with fixed set of people. These is measured through the
features “sociality” and “dynamicity”:
Sociality of User A = Number of contacted Callees by User ATotal calls generated by User A
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Dynamicity of User A = Number of contacted Callees by User ATotal Number of Users
In our analysis, a users can be tagged as “social” if it is found that dur-
ing the observation window his “sociality”>=0.4 and “dynamicity”>0.06.
The following metrics are used to identify the relative power, influence
and importance of a user inside a community:
• Degree Centrality–In a “social network” the degree centrality is de-
fined as the number of ties that a node has. In our context, we define
the degree of a user as the total number of people he/she reaches di-
rectly (dials and receives calls) during the observation window. There
are usually two separate measures of degree centrality, namely in-
degree and out-degree. In telephone communication scenario, in-degree
of a user refers to the number of calls he/she receives, while, out-degree
refers to the number of calls he/she dials during the observation win-
dow.
• Betweenness Centrality–In Social Sciences, betweenness centrality
[21] is a measure of a node’s centrality in a “social network”. It is
equal to the number of shortest paths from all vertices to all others
that pass through that node. Betweenness centrality is a more useful
measure (than just connectivity) of both the load and importance of a
node. The higher this parameter, the more influential the node is. The
nodes which have high betweenness centrality are not necessarily the
ones that have the most connections and do not have to be the most
popular ones. In our context, it measures how likely a person falls in
the most direct route between two people in the social communication
network.
• Closeness Centrality–The average distance from a given node to all
other nodes in the network. In our context, it is the measure of how
fast a person can reach everyone else in the network.
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The following concepts are used in describing the social behavior of
users:
• Neighbor–Neighbors of a cluster i indicate the set of users (from
other user groups) who are communicated by the members of cluster
i during the observation window. It is defined as Ni.
• Communication Network–In order to map and measure the rela-
tionship and communication flows between members of a cluster and
users from other groups, we define the concept of community network.
The communication network for a cluster consists of its members and
neighbors and defined as CNi, where i = Number of clusters. It is
defined as:
Mi = Number of Users inside Clusteri
Ni = Number of Users Communicated by members of Clusteri
CNi = Mi +Ni
• Sub-Network–A sub-network refers to the strongly connected small
community/group inside a communication network. It is defined as
SN ji , where i = Number of clusters, and j = Index of sub-network.
After analyzing the connection and interaction of users of 15 clusters,
five different social behavioral patterns are noticed. The five social behav-
ioral patterns of the “internal” users are described in Table 7.3 using a set
of features. A brief description of these patterns is found below.
User Behavior Pattern 1: Medium Volume Caller
Users of three different communities/clusters (cluster1, cluster7 and cluster9)
follow this behavioral pattern. The main characteristic of these users is
that they generate at least three times higher than the number of calls
they receive during the observation window. Though these users usually
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Table 7.3: Five distinct social behavioral patterns of “internal active” users
Feature Pattern 1 Pattern 2 Pattern 3 Pattern
4
Pattern 5
Description Medium
Caller
Heavy
Caller
Medium
Receiver
Heavy
Receiver
Both Caller
& Receiver
Num. of users 577 435 161 541 837
Num. of clusters 3 2 1 5 4
Num. of “social” user 38 63 24 52 40
Activity Duration 60% 80% 80% 68% 80%
Dialed Call Percentage 25% 53% 0.84% 0.67% 20.49%
Received Call Percentage 3.52% 12.80% 5.89% 44.91% 32.88%
Active Hour in a day 8-17 8-17 8-17 8-17 8-17
Inactive Months August &
December
August &
December
August &
December
August
& De-
cember
August &
December
Average Call Duration 4 min 4 min 4 min 4 min 4 min
generate more calls than they receive, the volume of the outgoing calls is
not too high. On average they generate less than 400 calls per year. We
define users of these communities as medium volume callers.
Users of these 3 clusters generate 25% calls of the total calls generated
by all the clusters of “internal active” users. Though, here users generate
huge call, most of their calls are directed to other groups of “internal” and
“external” users. That is why, users of the same clusters are very lightly
connected with each other. This indicates that users of these three clusters
are grouped together based on their similarity of common friends outside
their clusters instead of direct communication between them. For instance,
Fig. 7.12 shows the internal communication between users of cluster1. It
shows that, more that 90% of the users of cluster1 has communicated with
each other for less than 10 times in a year. Most of the users of these
clusters remain active at least for 60% time of the observation window.
The average duration of the dialed and received calls by users of these
clusters is 4 minutes. Most of the calls generated and received by users of
these clusters are during peak hour of working days.
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Figure 7.12: Internal communication of users inside cluster1. The thinnest edge indicates
10 calls. Red filled “circles” indicate callers and grey filled “circles” indicate receivers.
Size of the vertex corresponds to the frequency of dialed & received called by user.
We also consider how users of these three clusters communicate with
other users (both “internal” and “external”). To this end, we consider the
communication network for each three clusters. For instance, the commu-
nication network of cluster1, CN1 consists of 8219 users (148 members of
cluster1 and 8205 neighbors who are communicated by members of cluster1
during the observation window). We find out that CN1 is very sparse.
About 70% of the neighbors are “external” users and a large number of
them appear very few times during the observation window. Only 76 users
out of 8219 are found who appear more than 100 times in a year to commu-
nicate other users of CN1. Fig. 7.13 shows the interaction pattern of these
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users in CN1. It is noticed that, among these 76 users only 6 are from
cluster1, while the rest of them are from other “internal” and “external”
groups. Thus, we can conclude that Fig. 7.13 shows the social interaction
of the most active 6 members of cluster1 where they maintain a strong
communication relation with other 70 users from the groups of “internal”
and “external” users. It is found that, the these active 72 users in CN1
are not fully connected, considering their call history for the observation
window, these users are divided into 7 sub-networks. Fig. 7.14 shows the
sub-networks of these users inside CN1 and also the betweenness centrality
of each users.
User Behavior Pattern 2: High Volume Caller
Users of two different communities (cluster5 and cluster6) follow this be-
havioral patter. The main characteristic of the communication pattern
of these users is that they generate at least six times higher number of
calls than they receive during the observation window. Users of these two
clusters generate 53% calls of the total calls generated by all the clusters
of the “internal active” users. Due to the high volume of outgoing calls
generated by users of these communities (on average they generate more
than 600 calls per year), they are defined as high volume caller.
70% of the calls generated by these users are towards other “internal”
and “external” groups of users, while, the remaining 30% of their calls are
generated and received by users of the same cluster. That is why, uses in-
side these two communities are lightly connected. This indicates that users
of these communities are grouped together based on both their similarity of
common friends with whom they communicated during the observation pe-
riod and their frequency of internal communication. For instance, Fig. 7.15
shows the 30% of the users of cluster5 that has communicated with each
other at least 30 times during a year.
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Figure 7.13: Communication network of cluster1, CN1. The thinnest edge indicates 100
calls and size of the vertex corresponds to the frequency of dialed & received call by each
user. Red “circles” indicate members of cluster1, green “circles” indicate internal users,
and, blue “circles” indicate external users.
Most of the users of these clusters remain active at least for 80% time of
the observation window. The average duration of the dialed and received
calls by users of these clusters is 4 minutes. We also consider how users
of these three clusters communicate with other users (both “internal” and
“external”). To this end, we consider the communication network for each
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Figure 7.14: Sub-networks inside the Communication network of cluster1. The thinnest
edge indicates 100 calls and size of the vertex corresponds to betweenness centrality of
each user. Vertices with the same color belong to the same sub-networks.
three clusters which consists of members and their neighbors. For instance,
the communication network of cluster5, CN5 consists of 20579 users (158
members of this cluster and 20421 neighbors who are communicated with
members of cluster5 during the observation window). At first glance, we
find this communication network to be very sparse due to the fact that
80% of the communicated users are “external”. That is why, around 60%
members of cluster5 appears to be very social (e.g., these users tend to dial
and receive calls from a large variety of people). Later, it is noticed that
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Figure 7.15: Internal communication of users inside cluster5. The thinnest edge indicates
30 calls. Red filled “circles” indicate callers, grey filled “circle” indicates receivers, and,
white “circle” indicates both caller and receiver. Size of the vertex corresponds to the
frequency of dialed & received called by user.
most of these “external” users appear very few times during the observa-
tion window. If we exclude the users that generate or receive less than
350 calls per year from CN5, then we find a well-connected network which
consists of only 52 of 20579 users. Figure 7.16 shows the social interaction
of these 52 users in CN5 and it is noticed that all of them are members of
cluster5. Based on their call pattern, these users are further divided into 5
strong sub-networks. This indicates that though each user of cluster5 com-
municated with a large number of users (both “internal” and “external”) of
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Figure 7.16: Communication network of cluster5, CN5 (Thinnest edge indicates 350 call,
size of the vertex corresponds to the frequency of dialed & received call by each user).
Red “circles” indicate members of cluster5.
outside their cluster, in the end, the most active and well-connected users
maintain a regular communication with a small number of people within
the same cluster. Fig. 7.17 shows the sub-networks of 52 users inside CN5
and also the betweenness centrality of each users.
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Figure 7.17: Sub-networks inside the Communication network of cluster5. The thinnest
edge indicates 350 calls, and and size of the vertex corresponds to betweenness centrality
of each user. Vertices with the same color belong to the same sub-networks.
User Behavior Pattern 3: Medium Level Receiver
Users of one community (cluster14) follow this behavioral pattern. These
users mainly receive a large number of calls (at least ten times higher
number of calls) than they generate. Though these users usually receive
more call than they dial, the in-coming call volume is not too high. On
average they receive less than 200 calls per year. That is why, we define
these users as medium level receiver.
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Though, here a few users generate calls, most of their calls are directed
to other clusters, “internal inactive” and “external” user groups. That is
why, users of cluster14 are very lightly connected with each other. This
indicates that users of this community are grouped together based on their
similarity of common friends from whom they receive a large number of
calls. Fig. 7.18 shows the internal communication between users of cluster14
(161 users). It shows that, only 8% of the users communicate with each
other for maximum 8 times during one year.
Figure 7.18: Internal communication of users inside cluster14 (Thinnest edge indicates
1 call). Red filled “circles” indicate callers, grey filled “circles” indicate receivers, and,
white “circles” indicate both caller and receiver. Size of the vertex corresponds to the
frequency of dialed & received calls by users.
Most of the users of cluster14 remain active at least for 60% time of the
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observation window. To understand the structure of social relationships
of users of this community (cluster14), we consider the communication
network of cluster14, CN14 which consists of 10, 176 users (161 members
of cluster14 and 10, 015 neighbors). We find out that this communication
networks is very sparse. About 80% of the neighbors are “external” users
and a large number of them appears very few times during the observation
window. Only the 109 of 10,176 users (of the communication network of
cluster14) communicated more than 50 times in the observation window.
In fact, these 109 users (consists of a few members of cluster14, other
“internal” and “external” users) have created a strongly connected network
inside CN14. Fig. 7.19 shows that these most active 109 users of CN14 build
sort of a star network where one user of cluster14 has strong connection to
most other users. We suspect that this central node probably a “shared
number” or a fax machine server. Fig. 7.20 shows that, users of CN14 can
be divided into 2 sub-networks based on the communication pattern.
User Behavior Pattern 4: High Volume Receiver
Users of four different communities/clusters (cluster 3, 10, 11, and, 12) fol-
low this behavioral pattern. The main characteristic of the communication
pattern of these users is that they receive a huge amount of calls than they
generate during the observation window. About 90% users receive at least
hundred times higher number of calls than they generate. On average they
receive more than 400 calls while generate less than 20 calls per year.
Though, users of these clusters receive a huge number of calls, most
of their calls are generated by other groups of “internal” and “external”
users. That is why, users inside these clusters are very lightly connected.
Fig. 7.21 shows the internal communication between users of cluster12. It
is noticed that users of cluster12 are not connected at all, this indicates
that users of this cluster are grouped together based on their similarity of
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Figure 7.19: Communication network of cluster14, CN14. The thinnest edge indicates 50
calls and size of the vertex corresponds to the frequency of dialed & received call by each
user. Red “circles” indicate members of cluster14, green “circles” indicate internal users,
and, blue “circles” indicate external users
common friends from whom they received a huge amount of calls during
the observation window.
Most of the users of these clusters remain active at least for 60% time of
the observation window. The average duration of the dialed and received
calls by users of these clusters is 4 minutes. We also consider how users
of these three clusters communicate with other users (both “internal” and
“external”). To this end, we consider the communication network of each
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Figure 7.20: Sub-networks inside the Communication network of cluster14 (Thinnest
edge indicates 50 calls, colors and size of the vertex corresponds to the internal sub-
communities, and betweenness centrality of each user). Vertices with the same color
belong to the same sub-networks.
of the four clusters. For instance, the communication network of cluster12,
CN12 consists of 6363 users (131 members of this cluster and 6232 neighbors
who are communicated with members of cluster12 during the observation
window). From CN12 it is noticed that around 63% of the communicated
users are external. But, most of them appear very few times during the
observation window. If we exclude the users that generate or receive less
than 80 calls per year from CN12, then we find a well-connected network
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Figure 7.21: Internal communication of users inside cluster12 (Thinnest edge indicates 5
calls). Red filled “circles” indicate callers and grey filled “circls” indicate receivers. Size
of the vertex corresponds to the frequency of dialed & received called by user.
which consists of only 114 of 6363 users. Fig. 7.22 shows the social inter-
action of these 114 users in CN12. These active users form 5 sub-networks
inside the CN12 based on their social relationship with each other (shown
in Fig. 7.23).
User Behavior Pattern 5: Both Caller & Receiver
Users of three communities (cluster2, cluster3 and cluster15) follow this
behavioral pattern. These users do not have any significant characteris-
tics, they usually both dial and receive a large number of calls, on average
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Figure 7.22: Communication network of cluster12, CN12. The thinnest edge indicates 80
calls, size of the vertex corresponds to the frequency of dialed & received call by each
user. Red “circles” indicate members of cluster1, green “circles” indicate internal users,
and, blue “circles” indicate external users.
they receive around 250 calls and dial around 200 calls per year. 60% of
their communicated users are from other “internal” and “external” groups
of users, while, the remaining 40% of their calls are directed to the users of
the same cluster. That is why, internal communications are observed inside
these three communities. This indicates that users of these three communi-
ties are grouped together based on both their similarity of common friends
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Figure 7.23: Sub-networks inside the Communication network of cluster12 (Thinnest
edge indicates 80 calls, colors and size of the vertex corresponds to the internal sub-
communities, and betweenness centrality of each user). Vertices with the same color
belong to the same sub-networks.
and the frequency of their internal communication. For instance, Fig. 7.24
shows the internal communication between users of cluster3. It shows the
37% of the users of this community that has communicated with each other
more than 20 times during a year.
Most of the users of cluster3 remain active at least for 80% time of the
observation window. The average duration of the dialed and received calls
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Figure 7.24: Internal communication of users inside cluster3 (Thinnest edge indicates 20
calls). Red filled “circle” indicates callers and white “circle” indicates both caller and
receiver. Size of the vertex corresponds to the frequency of dialed & received called by
user.
by users of these clusters is 4 minutes. Most of the calls generated and
received by users of these clusters are during peak hour of working days.
The communication network of cluster3, CN3 consists of 4992 users
(119 members of cluster3 and 4873 neighbors who are communicated with
members of cluster3 during the one year observation window). At first
152
7.3. DETECTION OF MALICIOUS USERS
glance, we find CN3 to be very sparse due to the fact that around 60% of
the communicated users are “external”. That is why, around 50% members
of cluster3 appears to be very social (e.g., these users tend to dial and
receive calls from a large variety of people). Later it is noticed that most
of these “external” users appear very few times during the observation
window. If we exclude the users that generate or receive less than 100 calls
per year from CN3, then we find a well-connected network of 48 users and
all of them are members of cluster3. Fig. 7.25 shows the communication
pattern of these 48 of 4992 users in CN3.
Based on their call pattern, these 48 users are further divided into 5
strong sub-networks. This indicates that though each user of cluster3 com-
municated with a large number of users (both “internal” and “external”),
in the end, the most active and well-connected users maintain a regular
communication with a small number of people within the same cluster.
Fig. 7.26 shows the sub-networks of 48 users inside CN3 and also the be-
tweenness centrality of each users.
7.3 Detection of Malicious Users based on Social
Interaction Pattern
Analysis of VoIP traffic and social interaction pattern of users can assist
the detection of malicious users. We have implemented a prototype of
malicious users detection system where the detection engine is a SVM
classifier. The information retrieved from the social behavior analysis of
VoIP users is used to train the classifier. The logical architecture of the
malicious message detection engine is shown in Fig. 3.2 in the “VoIP Call
Filtering Module”. This section demonstrates the performance of the that
filtering module. This module controls the well-formed SIP messages (that
are successfully passed the syntax and semantic error checking) to detect
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Figure 7.25: Communication network of cluster3 (Thinnest edge indicates 100 calls, size
of the vertex corresponds to the frequency of dialed & received call by each user). Red
“circles” indicate members of cluster3.
the presence of malicious content and users.
7.3.1 Training of SVM Classifier
Application of social network analysis techniques in the stream of SIP mes-
sages (captured from our institution) reveals normal behavioral pattern of
the “internal” users (both “active” and “inactive”) in the system (described
in Section 7.2). Specially, five behavioral patterns of the “internal active”
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Figure 7.26: Sub-networks inside the Communication network of cluster3 (Thinnest
edge indicates 100 calls, colors and size of the vertex corresponds to the internal sub-
communities, and betweenness centrality of each user). Vertices with the same color
belong to the same sub-networks.
users are noticed and we consider all of them to be “legitimate”4.
The SVM classifier is trained with the “legitimate” behavior patterns of
“active” and “inactive” internal users. The classifier, thus, learned about
the behavior of “internal” users, examines the unlabeled call vectors in the
4VoIP network of our institution being a closed network, the probability of transmitting “harmful”
messages is low.
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“test” set. During this process, the classifier observes the behavior of the
“internal” users and any suspicious deviation of their behavior is identified.
7.3.2 Data Set
The performance of the “VoIP Call Filtering Module” of the SIP message
filtering system proposed in section 3.2 is evaluated through various exper-
iments. For these experiments we have used a sub-set of the collected SIP
traces from our institution. The sub-set of the collected sample consists
of six months (October 2013- March 2014) SIP trace with around 96 mil-
lions SIP messages. The SIP messages are further processed and 422, 687
calls are retrieved from the 96 million SIP messages among which 230, 816
were successfully established. Each call is represented with the information
about the arrival time, duration, caller and receiver name of the call which
is known as the CDR (call detail record). Around 48 thousand SIP URIs
are found that are related to these calls, among these 8, 498 are internal
users while the remaining are external users.
Dataset collected from our institution do not contain any messages that
were maliciously sent with the intention of harming the network due to the
fact that this is a closed network. To counteract the lack of “malicious”
calls in our collected sample, we randomly inject synthetic “malicious” calls
into the stream of real VoIP calls. The synthetic attack traces are generated
using our developed synthetic traffic generator “VoIPTG” (described in
Section 5.3).
Injection of Synthetic Malicious Traces
Though there are various kinds of “attacks” listed in the literature, in this
experiment, we have focused on detection of social threats (e.g., spam calls
or SPIT) and toll fraud.
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We focus on these two categories of attacks as detection of these silent
attacks is difficult. For instance, the characteristics of the spam callers are
not always clearly separable from that of the “legitimate” users. Usually,
telemarketers and advertisers tend to call a large number of people to
deliver their messages [8,10,32,41,106,108,165,169] often resulting in short
duration calls as the other party quickly hangs up after realizing that the
call is spam. Thus, the spam callers have high out-going degree with very
low or almost zero incoming degree as usually they receives very limited
calls or no call at all. On the other hand, traffic analysis of real trace
collected from our institution shows that a large number of “legitimate”
users only generate calls while receives very few or no call at all during the
whole observation period. In such context, it requires a delicate handling to
distinguish the group of “legitimate” callers from the group of spammers.
Inorder to imitate social attack scenario, we inject a huge amount of
“spam” calls randomly selected 110 “internal” (70 “active” and 40 “inac-
tive”) users among 8, 498 users found in the dataset containing real VoIP
calls. Following the general assumption about the characteristics of the
“spam” calls, these synthetic calls are generated during peak hour, with
very low interarrival time difference and of short duration. Callers of these
calls are a set of synthetically generated “external” SIP uris that refers to
the set of spam callers.
Toll fraud attack refers to the scenario where due to the deployment
of inadequate security, “malicious” users can make unauthorized usage of
paid communication services (such as international calling) where they may
call few subscribers (“legitimate” users) of the network and prepended a
“malicious” number (mostly in some other country) to which the system
sets up calls. In result, the organization has to pay a huge phone bill that is
way higher than its typical monthly bill. In order to imitate such scenario,
we randomly select 60 “internal” users (30 “active” and 30 “inactive”). A
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Table 7.4: Description of synthetic attacks scenarios
Scenario Description Time Total
Call
“Internal”
Users
“Malicious”
Users
“Spam” calls 2 week (weekdays) 8 am-5 pm 40,000 30 30
“Spam” calls 1 week (weekdays) 8 am-12 pm 30,000 40 30
“Spam” calls 1 week (weekdays) 11 am-6 pm 30,000 40 30
“Toll Fraud” 4 week (weekdays
& weekends)
8 am-11 pm 80,000 40 30
“Toll Fraud” 2 week (weekdays) 8 am-5 pm 20,000 20 30
large number of synthetic calls are injected into the real trace indicating
that these calls are generated from these 60 users to a set of external SIP
URIs (indicating “malicious” numbers). Details about the synthetic attack
scenarios are reported in Table 7.4.
Detail about the new “test” set (combination of real and synthetic calls)
is found in Table 7.5.
7.3.3 Performance Evaluation
Detail about achieved accuracy by the SVM classifier on the “test” set is
found in Table 7.5. The SVM classifier checks the behavior of all the
8, 498 internal users (observed in the test set). Total 1,020 “internal”
users are found those were not present during the training period. The
classifier declares them as “good” user as they follow the behavioral pattern
of “legitimate” users during the observation window. On the other hand,
behavior of 426 users are identified as “suspicious” due to the fact that
these users suddenly become “active” during “test” period, while they
were “inactive” during training. These users are “legitimate”.
All our experiments are done in a machine of Intel Core i7 CPU, 2.0
GHz Quad-core and 8 GB RAM memory. We have also focused on the time
required for the SVM classifier to detect an attack scenario. This classifier
observes every call and checks the behavior of the “internal” users associ-
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Table 7.5: SIP call classification result using SVM
Description Value
Total Calls 430,816
Number of real “good” calls 230,816
Number of synthetic “spam” calls 100,000
Number of synthetic “toll fraud” calls 100,000
Total Number of Users observed in test set 48,699
Number of “internal active” users found in test set 1,985
Number of “internal inactive” users found in test set 6,513
Number of “external active” users found in test set 412
Number of “external inactive” users found in test set 39,789
New “internal active” users not found during training 33
New “internal inactive” users not found during training 987
Number of “internal” users who receive synthetic “spam” calls 110
Number of “internal” users who generate synthetic “toll fraud” calls 60
SVM Classifier Result
True positive(“malicious” users identified as “malicious”) 161
False positive(“good” users identified as “malicious”) 426
True negative(“good” users identified as “good”) 7,902
False negative(“malicious” users identified as “good”) 9
Accuracy 94.88%
ated with that call. As soon as it notices any significant deviation of the
behavior of any of the “internal” users from his/her “normal” behavior, the
classifier suspects that user as “malicious”. In the synthetic attack scenar-
ios (described in Table 7.4), the attack starts slowly from zero and increases
until it reaches the maximum rate, then, the maximum rate is maintained
constant until the attack duration stops. We noticed that the SVM classi-
fier is able to detect the attacks as soon as the traffic reaches the maximum
rate. For example, during synthetic “social” attack scenario, huge amount
of spam calls (at least 100 call/day) are directed to an “internal” users for
five consecutive days. This changes the victim user’s behavior significantly
in the context of receiving calls as he/she normally receive at most 10/20
calls per day. The classifier observes each call directed to this user and
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Table 7.6: Experiments performed on traces generated by “Spitter” tool
Description Value
Total Calls 5,000
Number of “good” calls 3,128
Number of “spam” calls 1,872
Total Number of “good” users 100
Total Number of “malicious” users 20
SVM Classifier Result
True positive(“malicious” users identified as “malicious”) 18
False positive(“good” users identified as “malicious”) 3
True negative(“good” users identified as “good”) 97
False negative(“malicious” users identified as “good”) 2
Accuracy 95.83%
it notices a dramatic increase in the frequency of received calls by this
user. At the end of the day, considering also the patterns (low duration
and interarrival time) of those incoming calls towards the victim user, the
classifier suspects that this user is receiving a lot of “spam” calls.
7.3.4 Experiment with “Spitter” tool
For the purpose of the evaluation of the performance and efficiency of our
proposed filtering system for SIP based VoIP networks with other attack
simulators, we have used “Spitter”5 which a publicly available tool imple-
mented by the author of [48] to perform VoIP spam testing. This tool uses
the Asterisk IP PBX as a platform from which it launches SPIT calls (i.e.
VoIP SPAM). The input file of “Spitter” contains one or more Asterisk
ASCII call “records” [191]. In order to avoid the risk of directly using this
tool to transmit spam calls through the SIP servers of our institution, we
followed an alternative way. We use the tool in test mode which allows the
generation of spam call records in the absence of an Asterisk installation.
The generated synthetic spam calls are injected the a set of “good” VoIP
5“Spitter” - http://www.hackingvoip.com/tools/spitter.tar.gz
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call records extracted from a sub-set of collected real SIP traces. Details
about dataset generated by the tool “Spitter” and performance evaluation
of our classifier with this dataset is found in Table 7.6.
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Conclusion
Voice over IP (VoIP) has become a major paradigm for providing flexible
telecommunication services while reducing operational and maintenance
costs. Being a fast-growing Internet application, VoIP shares the network
resources with the regular Internet traffic, and is susceptible to the existing
security holes of the Internet. Moreover, given that voice communication
is time sensitive and uses a suite of interacting protocols (e.g., SIP, RTP),
VoIP exposes to new forms of vulnerabilities specific to these protocols and
real time communication constraints. Thus, security of VoIP communica-
tions has become increasingly important.
This thesis has contributed to the field of security of SIP based VoIP
in several ways, looking both into general issues like defining a formal
representation of VoIP related security issues and more specific topics like
to design and implementation of traffic analysis and filtering systems.
The first contribution is a filtering system for the conformance and secu-
rity control of the SIP based VoIP services. This proposed filtering system
can be considered as a second line of defense of SIP based VoIP networks to
detect the violation of existing security policies. It analyzes the stream of
incoming and outgoing SIP messages of the network to discard the messages
with syntax and semantic errors. Considering the difference in structure,
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content and timing of the “erroneous” SIP messages, the proposed filtering
system consists of a multistage classifiers. The first stage controls the va-
lidity of the message syntax through a deterministic and efficient process.
While first stage filtering is straightforward, as the classification is crisp
(either a messages belongs to the language or it does not), the second stage
requires a more delicate handling, as it is not a sharp decision whether a
message is semantically meaningful or not. The approach we followed for
this step is based on using past experience on previously classified mes-
sages, i.e. a “learn-by-example” approach, which led to classifiers based on
Support-Vector-Machines (SVM) to perform the required analysis of each
incoming SIP message. The advantages of the SVM is that very few pa-
rameters are required for tuning the learning machine and a small sample
set can build the model to classify huge unlabeled dataset. It is observed
that careful selection and configuration of the kernels of the SVM is utmost
important for the efficient implementation of the classifier, as well as on
its training to achieve a high accuracy in the classification process. The
efficiency of the filtering system tested both with real and artificial traces
is very promising. In an effort to reduce the computational complexity of
the SVM classifier, additional analyses showed that virtually the same ac-
curacy could be achieved even when reducing the size of the set of feature
vectors through principal component analysis.
The second contribution has considered the use of Social Network Anal-
ysis (SNA) techniques to explore the social behavioral patters of VoIP
users. “Social networks” of VoIP users are build from their call records for
a large observation window (e.g., one and a half years). We have shown
the influence of the analysis of social groups of VoIP users in application
of security policies and detection of malicious users. To this end, an extra
stage is added to our proposed multistage filtering architecture. This stage
consists of a Support Vector Machine (SVM) classifier which “learns” the
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social behavioral profiles of the legitimate users through an initial training
phase and, the SVM, thus configured correctly is able to detect malicious
in the VoIP traffic.
Finally, we have introduced “VoIPTG”, a generic traffic simulator, which
is capable to generate traffic following various possible models of SIP based
VoIP system with special attention to characterize the sophisticated user
behavior in the system. This simulator is implemented to address the lack
of a publicly available dataset containing VoIP traces for testing security
control systems. This stochastic generator focuses on modeling the realistic
behavior profiles for users and attackers, and, thus provides flexibility and
efficiency in generation of large amount of synthetic traffic of SIP based
VoIP system. To generate the message level VoIP traffic, we have imple-
mented “SIP-Msg-Gen”, a state-full and context aware SIP fuzzer, which
is capable of generating both “good” and “bad” SIP messages.
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Appendix A
List of Features
According to the architecture of our SIP message filtering system described
in Chapter 6, after the first stage checking for syntax error, each well-formed
message is further processed where 26 significant features extracted from a
SIP message. These features are selected by expert knowledge about VoIP
systems and they take into consideration aspects related to the structure
and the content of a SIP message.
Table A.1: List of Features for classification of SIP messages
ID Feature Description Value Range
1 Message Type This feature indicates the type (Re-
quest/Response) of a SIP message
0=Unknown Method, 1-
14=Request Method, 15=Response
Message
2 Request Line Status This feature indicates the status
and frequency (absence/multiple) of
Request-Line in a Request Mes-
sage.It is required to identify error
in Request-Line
-1= In wrong position, 0 = No
Request-Line, 1=In perfect position
, >1=Multiple Request-Line
3 Protocol Version This feature contains information
about SIP protocol version. It is re-
quired to detect error, such as, un-
known or higher protocol version
SIP protocol version
Continued on next page
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Table A.1 – continued from previous page
ID Feature Description Value Range
4 Empty Line Status This feature indicates the status
and occurrence of empty line in a
message. It is required to detect
hierarchical disorder in a message
due to multiple/incorrect presence
of empty line in a message
-1=in wrong position, 0=no empty
line, >1=multiple empty line
5 Message order This feature contains information
about the hierarchical order of a SIP
message. It holds information of any
kind of disorder in a message
1=message in order, -1=message is
not in order
6 Presence of garbage
string
This feature indicates the presence
of garbage strings in a message
-1=presence of garbage string, 1=no
garbage string
7 Response Line Status This feature indicates the sta-
tus (absence/multiple) of Response-
Line in a Response Message
Frequency of Request-line in a mes-
sage
8 Scalar value of “CSeq”
header
This feature contains the value of
the scalar field in ’CSeq’ header
Value of scalar field in “CSeq”
header
9 Scalar value of “Max-
Forwards” header
This feature contains the value of
the scalar field in “Max-Forwards”
header
Value of scalar field in ’Max-
Forwards’ header
10 Scalar value of “Content-
Length” header
This feature contains the value of
the scalar field in “Content-Length”
header
Value of scalar field in ’Content-
Length’ header
11 Missing Mandatory
Header
This feature contains the informa-
tion whether any specific mandatory
header field is missing in a message.
0=All mandatory fields are present,
-1=missing mandatory header fields
in Response message
12 Method Name This feature indicates the method
name of a Request message
0=Unknown Method Name, 1–
14=Valid Request Method
13 Request-URI status This feature contains the status of
Request-URI. This feature is used
to identify unknown Request-URI
scheme in a Request message
-1=Unknown Request-URI scheme,
1=Correct Request-URI scheme
14 IP address in “Via”
header
This feature contains the IP ad-
dress of “Via” header field of a Re-
sponse message. This feature is re-
quired to identify Response message
which intends to broadcast due to IP
(“255.255.255.255”) in ’Via’ header
1= header ok, -1=error in IP ad-
dress
Continued on next page
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ID Feature Description Value Range
15 Size of Response code This feature indicates the length of
a Response Message. It is used to
detect very large Response message
Length of the Response Message
16 Mandatory header field
“Call-ID” status
This feature indicates the occur-
rence of header field “Call-ID” in a
message
Frequency of header field ’Call-ID’
in a message. 0= Missing, 1=Single
appearance, 2= Duplicate appear-
ance... of “Call-ID” in a message
17 Mandatory header field
“CSeq” status
This feature indicates the occur-
rence of header field “CSeq” in a
message
Frequency of header field “CSeq” in
a message. 0= Missing, 1= Single
appearance and ok, >1= Multiple
appearances
18 Unknown Header Field This feature indicates the presence
of unknown header field in a mes-
sage.
1=no unknown header field, -
1=unknown header field
19 Mandatory header field
“Contact” status
This feature indicates the occur-
rence of header field “Contact” in a
message. It is used to detect error
such as missing or multiple occur-
rence of “Contact” header field in a
message.
Frequency of header field “Contact”
in a message. 0=Missing, 1=Single
appearance, >1=Multiple appear-
ances
20 Mandatory header field
“From” status
This feature indicates the occur-
rence of header field “From” in a
message. It is used to detect error
such as missing or multiple occur-
rence of “From” header field in a
message.
Frequency of header field “From” in
a message. 0= Missing, 1=Single
appearance, >1 =Multiple appear-
ances
21 Mandatory header field
“Max-Forwards” status
This feature indicates the oc-
currence of header field “Max-
Forwards” in a message. It is used to
detect error such as missing or mul-
tiple occurrence of “Max-Forwards”
header field in a message.
Frequency of header field “Max-
Forwards” in a message. 0=Missing,
1=Single appearance, >1=Multiple
appearances
22 Mandatory header field
“To” status
This feature indicates the occur-
rence of header field “To” in a mes-
sage. It is used to detect error such
as missing or multiple occurrence of
“To” header field in a message
Frequency of header field “To” in
a message. 0= Missing, 1=Single
appearance, >1=Multiple appear-
ances
Continued on next page
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Table A.1 – continued from previous page
ID Feature Description Value Range
23 Frequency header field
“Via” status
This feature indicates the occur-
rence of header field “Via” in a mes-
sage. It is used to detect error such
as missing or multiple occurrence of
“Via” header field in a message
Frequency of header field “Via” in
a message. 0=Missing, 1=Single
appearance, >1=Multiple appear-
ances
24 “Authentication Info”
header field status
This feature contains information
about the “Authentication Info”
header fields. This feature is used to
detect any error in this field, such as
unauthorized scheme
-1= Contains error, 1= No error in
header field.
25 “Content Language”
header field status
Contains information about the
“Content Language” header fields.
This feature is used to detect any
error in this field, such as unautho-
rized scheme
-1=Contains error, 1=No error in
header field
26 Combination of Request-
line & Response-Line
This feature contains information
about the presence of both Request-
line and Response-line in the same
message
-1=Contains error, 1=No error
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